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ABSTRACT
HUMAN-MACHINE SYSTEM DESIGN OPTIMIZATION FOR NON-DETERMINISTIC 
SPACECRAFT ANOMALY DETERMINATION/RESOLUTION
By
Kriss Quinn Hunold 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2002
This research examines the dependence of knowledge on decision making with 
varying levels of uncertainty or non-deterministic situations. The work presented 
outlines a global approach that is not limited to a specific case study example, but can 
also be translated to other systems requiring operators, a degree of automation, time 
constraints, remote control, and high levels of personnel expertise. The specific 
objective of this study was to address the uncertainty inherent in satellite command and 
control and to assess and understand the role of human knowledge in the combined 
human-machine system unit. This research focused solely on the user component of 
complex human-machine systems. Machine technology level remained constant; no 
modifications or variations were made to the machine operating system. However, the 
user knowledge level was altered to examine the effect of this variation and resulting 
operator ability to troubleshoot and resolve system anomalies.
The case study researched was the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite 
constellation currently in use by Air Force Space Command for missile warning. Three 
different 'Types" of tasks were defined, where the three Type categories (1, 2, and 3) 
represented the level of task difficulty (low, moderate and high). Each task consisted of 
resolving a unique satellite vehicle anomaly within pre-scripted scenarios.
xv
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The role of human knowledge was examined and found to be significantly 
important. This result was more evident as the situation uncertainty or complexity of the 
task increased. This data may be useful to continue the optimization of both user and 
machine to create a human-machine system capable of adapting to the rapidly changing 
space environment and able to contribute more fully to tomorrow's space control 
objectives.
xvi




The roles of machines and humans in space systems have perplexed system 
designers since the advent of their use in early 1960's. Space systems are challenging 
systems to study since the human-machine system occurs remotely over a distance of 
thousands of miles, where the earth-based user never visually connects with the in-flight 
system they are monitoring and ultimately affecting. In essence, there is always a 
“correct” solution to a satellite problem, assuming all data is complete. “Correctness" is 
indicative of the exact, definitive solution necessary to remedy the satellite problem. 
However, the realization that oftentimes the data is incomplete (or non-deterministic) 
presents an entirely new set of problems to the satellite controller. To compound the 
issue, satellite anomalies are only evident by examination of the telemetry displayed 
through the operator consoles on ground.
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) has been wrestling with determining the 
most efficient and cost-effective method of performing satellite command and control 
(C2). As AFSPC moves towards the goal of space control, the problems posed to the 
satellite operator become increasingly more non-deterministic, meaning that they are 
more complex, foreign, and often associated with incomplete data where the anomaly 
cause cannot be conclusively assessed. In anticipation of how satellite command and 
control will evolve in the future, it seems evident that there will continue to be increased
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
complexity and uncertainty present in the space environment, requiring more adept 
problem solving expertise than ever before.
The systems design approach presented here will involve a case study of one 
particular space system where the roles of human and machine could be adjusted to 
create a better overall unit to perform satellite commanding and control. This is 
increasingly important when impacted by data uncertainty. Since most systems have 
components of both a machine and human working synergistically to achieve a common 
goal, it is important to address both components thoroughly during the system 
development phase.
Customarily, engineers and scientists are more familiar or comfortable with the 
machine portion of design since it is usually predictable and easily understood. 
Conversely, determining the "best operator'’ to design a system for can be a laborious 
and subjective process; human metrics can be difficult to assess and quantify. In this 
study, the "best operator" can be described as that person who can perform all 
necessary on-orbit functions, to include ground configuration, satellite command and 
control, engineering, and anomaly troubleshooting. They have capacity for cognitive skill 
and intuition, and can operate autonomously in performing problem diagnosis and 
resolution. The "best operator" can operate in presence of uncertainty and with no 
direction. In addition, they can perform tasks with minimal or no supervision, and in 
situations where no prior contingency planning exists.
The overarching system design process initiated in this study (in combination 
with future research) will strive to accomplish two objectives:
1) Determine the operator knowledge level (derived from training and 
experience) best suited to complete the task at hand when combined with the 
machine side {within the scope of this study}
2
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2) Create an intelligent, intuitive and effective interface for that operator to work 
with {future research}.
The interface is extremely important, since it is the sole tool that facilitates effective and 
accurate troubleshooting, implements the display of the necessary telemetry data, and 
promotes operator vigilance in detection of anomalous situations.
The approach used in this study is to investigate the trouble-shooting success 
rates of different operators of varying knowledge levels. The test results obtained from 
studying these operators of different skill levels may be used to guide what design 
strategies, machine enhancements and automation can be incorporated in a new 
satellite control system. Future machine enhancements for a current satellite control 
system could include automation of certain deterministic commanding, or at a minimum, 
state of health (SOH) anomaly notification. The new system can guide either the 
operator, the computer, or operator aided by the computer through a sequence of 
actions to solve problems, troubleshoot anomalies, or perform routine or emergency 
commanding. The responsibility of consequential decision making will often lie with the 
user; however, the machine will provide some guidance to its human counterpart to aid 
the operator in making a decision and to ensure that irreparable damage is not caused 
to the on-board systems. With user and machine working cooperatively in this manner, 
human error can be minimized. Consequently, superior human abilities of problem 
solving and decision making are strengthened by the computer’s capabilities of raw data 
filtering and interpretation, thus allowing the human to be used more efficiently.
According to Sarter in his studies of the Airbus A-320 (Sarter, 1997), "advanced 
automated systems required a high degree of authority and autonomy. Their resulting 
agent-like behavior required increased coordination between human and machine to 
ensure that the system operator maintained a high level of awareness of the activity and 
intentions of the automated system." This indicates that the awareness and intuition
3
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level required by the operator also supports an individual with experience and training. 
This is especially important in situations where “increasing knowledge demands, coupled 
with static or decreasing training investments, can easily lead to significant gaps or 
misconceptions in user’s mental models of the automated systems they manage" 
(Sarter, 1997). Intuitively, this would also confirm that automation does not give license 
to selecting a minimally trained or inept operator. The converse appears true; when the 
human and machine are integrated more closely, the operator must interpret the 
machine at a high level and understand the consequence of an incorrect action. 
Furthermore, the operator should have the capacity to override the machine and 
troubleshoot the situation if an incorrect automation sequence is suggested.
There are several interrogation methods for determining satellite health. Optical 
telescopes can assess satellite position and physical configurations, but coordination to 
use these assets requires time that would extend past the point where intervention could 
avert such anomalies. In addition, only external satellite health (tumble, solar panels, 
exterior damage) can be assessed by optical means. Satellite telemetry is the method 
most readily available to determine the overall (external and internal) health of the 
satellite. However, if mechanisms such as transmitters, receivers and commanding links 
on board have failed, the vehicle is unable to provide data. In addition, telemetry is not 
always completely accurate and reliable due to jamming, interference, data link 
anomalies, and internal component failures.
This study will investigate how humans interface with machines in lieu of 
incomplete or missing data, which is a typical occurrence when dealing with remote 
systems. Since there is no visual contact with the vehicle and the true state of the 
satellite cannot be ascertained, one must act on assumptions, knowledge, or prior 
experience based on the data presented. The decision options tend to have different 
levels of confidence associated with each. Uncertainty is added to the decision making
4
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process by means of spacecraft subsystem anomalies, the overall space environment 
(geomagnetic status, solar wind, and solar storms), and satellite control interference 
(unintentional or deliberate).
1.2 Objective
The following study objective outlines a global approach that is not limited to 
satellite vehicle command and control, but can also be translated to other systems 
requiring operators, a degree of automation, time constraints, remote control, and high 
levels of personnel expertise.
This research will focus solely on the user component of satellite command and 
control. Machine technology level will remain constant; no modifications or variations 
will be made to the machine operating system. However, the user knowledge level will 
be altered to examine the effect of this variation and resulting operator ability to 
troubleshoot and resolve satellite anomalies. Two different levels of operator knowledge 
will be examined, where the term knowledge in the study represents the level of training 
and experience held by a particular user. The two knowledge levels used are identified 
as standard and expert.
Standard level: describes a fully qualified operator currently performing satellite 
operations in the case study satellite system. These operators were trained to 
the level of training and experience currently baselined and approved by Air 
Force Space Command. The "mean time qualified” for these individuals was less 
than two years, and the training period generally lasts for two to three months.
Expert level: describes a fully qualified operator able to perform all functions of 
satellite operations in the case study system. These operators were trained
5
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beyond the current, approved training baseline and have extensive engineering 
knowledge of the satellite system. These operators are recognized by Air Force 
Space Command as experts, and are designated as such with the title Technical 
Advisors”. For the purposes of this study, the “mean time qualified" for these 
individuals was defined as over four years of training and experience.
In order to define the expertise needed to perform various tasks associated with 
anomaly resolution, different task levels, or Types” will be examined. This process 
involves categorizing many of the possible anomalies an operator might encounter into 
Types 1, 2, or 3 based on complexity and resolution difficulty. Each task type is 
associated with an increasing level of complexity of satellite anomaly. This process may 
enable leadership to ascertain what level of knowledge is necessary to resolve certain 
types of anomalies. If a certain level of risk is acceptable, then perhaps decision makers 
would prefer to have operators capable of resolving only a Type 1 or 2 anomaly as their 
“standard”, translating into a specific individual possessing a distinct level of training and 
experience.
This study focuses on varying the operator experience and training level only, 
and keeping the machine portion of the system constant. Although the end result of 
system optimization would require variation of both components, it is useful to assess 
each entity separately to gain understanding of the human-machine system. Follow on 
research should focus on optimizing the machine interface by varying technology and 
automation while maintaining one consistent knowledge level during the test process.
The following chapters will detail the history of this problem within the military 
satellite control field. However, this issue is very applicable to many disciplines in 
commerce and industry. In addition to the background discussion, methodology used to 
construct the experiment and statistical results will be presented.
6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1.3 Purpose/Benefits
This project could greatly benefit Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) by 
contributing a concrete study with objective data and statistical results. The comparison 
of current operator knowledge level and crew structure to a smaller, expert case-study 
crew is extremely relevant and valuable, and could facilitate objective conclusions on 
structuring tomorrow's satellite operations crew force. The understanding of the human- 
machine system gained from this project could be employed in planning for a future 
force able to execute space control missions with increased overall effectiveness. 
Moreover, this effort stands to benefit the Center of Research Support (CERES) as a 
test bed for external interfaces, and would be their first venture into cooperative research 
efforts. Contributors to this effort were comprised of a University of New Hampshire 
(UNH) doctoral candidate, active duty Air Force operators from the 50m Space Wing/1st 
Space Operations Squadron, Air Force Reserve operators from the 7th Space 
Operations Squadron and personnel from every discipline at CERES.
7
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Chapter 2
DEFINING THE PROBLEM
2.1 Defining the Problem
Optimization of the entire human-machine unit is a process that must occur 
incrementally. This study concentrates on the human portion of the system, and 
subsequent research will focus on optimizing and investigating the machine component. 
Spanning both of these elements is the fundamental problem of how to balance the 
machine and human in large, complex systems. Clearly, if all aspects of a particular 
system can be accurately defined and characterized, then this optimization approach 
can be universally applied to any systems having these same attributes. These 
characteristics will be investigated and discussed in the chapter, after which knowledge 
will be added to the systems engineering understanding for these decision systems. If 
we consider two separate but identical systems and add knowledge to one, at what point 
does complexity of inputs create a variance between them?
Optimization will also involve supplying final data to be used for research 
continuation at the Center for Research Support (CERES), located at the Joint National 
Test Facility at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado. CERES is working to create 
informative operator displays by means of indicating failure points and anomalous 
situations, in addition to automation of routine, deterministic 'Type T' level anomaly 
commanding. Automation, used properly, frees the operator to focus attention on non- 
deterministic problems, troubleshooting or more complex anomalies (Types 2 and 3).
8
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2.2 Characterization of Decision Support Systems
The Decision Support Systems of interest are two-part systems characterized by 
the following attributes:
A. Human-Machine Component
1) The portion comprised of a human and machine element, where:
• The human brings experience or knowledge
• The machine provides decision support and automation capability
2) The machine portion of the system can help identify the problem and provide 
a potential corrective action for the complex system
3) The decisions are tightly constrained in time
4) Decisions must be extremely precise and made with a high level of 
confidence
B. Operating System Component
5) Limited or incomplete data (or information/knowledge) is injected into the 
decision support system from the operating system
6) The operating system is remote, meaning there is no visual confirmation of 
the true problem and the corrective effect
7) There exists a "correct" answer for a problem under consideration given the 
real input. If complete data was always obtainable, one would know the right 
action to take when resolving anomalous situations. This also implies we are 
dealing strictly with physical systems. One limitation is that occasionally 
situations exist where the problem cannot be successfully repaired (e.g., 
battery explosion); however, safing actions may still be implemented.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2.3 Approach to the Problem
It is possible to construct a "System A versus System B" approach to measure 
the effectiveness of the existing system with that of an optimized system. In these 
systems we have two portions: the Operating System (the satellite vehicle) and the 
Human-Machine (or Decision) System. The Operating System is assumed to be a 
deterministic system, whereas the Decision system is non-deterministic in nature due to 
missing or incomplete data. The theory is given a series of inputs that are varied 
according to the number, rate, and complexity, we can examine how well each system 
(A and B) can identify each anomaly and correct it. The measures of success are the 
number of errors committed, the respective personnel costs of operation (in number of 
persons required to do the job), efficiency (time required to properly identify and correct 
the problem) and accuracy. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 display a schematic of how a system A 
versus system B approach might be viewed.
Assessing number of errors can have several implications. Simply stated, this 
can be determining the number of incorrect commands sent or delays in commanding 
the satellite. However, repercussions of physically reducing the number of operators 
had to be contemplated. One effect of operator reduction is possible lack of vigilance 
and effectiveness in the event of operator illness, fatigue, operator unavailability and 
similar crises. The benefit to having multiple operators on console is redundancy and 
additional monitoring capability. Yet, this benefit is extremely minimal since currently 
there is little overlap in crew functionality. There could be some benefit for error 
reduction with the current scheme of two Satellite System Operators as outlined in 
Section 3.3. However, there is almost no sharing of knowledge, function, or expertise 
between the positions of Engineers, Ground Systems Operators, and Satellite System 
Operators.
10
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2.4 Anomaly "Type" Analysis
It is important to try to define knowledge levels so we may better grasp what it 
means to require an expert level of knowledge versus a standard level. One approach is 
to predict problem 'Types" by examining as many potential problems or anomalies that 
can be encountered by the human in the system. These types can be defined in the 
following way:
1) Type 1: Simple complexity tasks. These tasks could possibly be automated, 
needing only minimal, if any, operator intervention. Type 1 typifies routine 
tasks.
2) Type 2: Medium complexity tasks. These tasks can be accompanied by 
some degree of automation capability, with the operator providing guidance 
for the tasks. Type 2 tasks are more difficult to resolve than those tasks that 
are characterized as Type 1” tasks and characterize function tasks such as 
switching components and altering satellite configurations.
3) Type 3: Difficult complexity, non-deterministic tasks. These tasks would 
probably not be well suited to automation, but could be expedited by a high 
degree of machine data filtering and advanced data presentation. In Type 3 
tasks, subtleties in data could possibly provide indications of multiple 
anomalous conditions, and are today typically characterized today by very 
rare and atypical anomalies. However, it is anticipated that future satellite 
operations situations will consist of infrequent but critical complex tasks 
characteristic of Type 3 anomalies.
Details pertaining to the statistical study and Type categorization can be found in 
Chapter 5 (Experiment Design).
11
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2.5 Automation
The benefits of incorporating automation into satellite command and control have 
been mentioned periodically in this document. However, some observations on the 
subject of automation should be considered. Occasionally, extensive automation can 
result in a out-of-the loop performance problem, causing a potential negative 
consequence (Billings, 1991; Moray, 1986; and Wickens, 1992). According to Endsley 
et al. (Endsley, et a!., 1995), “system operators working with automation have been 
found to have a diminished ability both to detect system errors and subsequently to 
perform tasks manually in the face of automation failures, compared with operators who 
manually perform the same tasks.” Essentially, an important automation concern is the 
loss of manual skills or focused attention which accompany the introduction of 
automated tasks. Therefore, while some tasks can be comfortably automated, care 
must be taken to not mentally remove the operator from their environment as to facilitate 
passivity or loss of diligence or vigilance.
12
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Figure 2 .1 : S tudy D escription
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•Cost
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the Defense Support Program (DSP) Command 
and Control Human-Machine System to decision 
success for given satellite outputs
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Human-Machine System performance with 
respect to the factor of human knowledge in 
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Chapter 3
PRESENT CASE STUDY BACKGROUND
AN EXAMPLE: Defense Support Program (DSP) Satellite Constellation
3.1 Background
The case study satellite system is the Defense Support Program (DSP). This 
constellation is the primary tool used for detection of missile launches and space vehicle 
launches for North America. The United States and Canada rely on these satellite 
vehicles for National Security and population defense, making this arguably one of the 
most critical space programs in our military’s possession. To provide full earth 
coverage, several vehicles hover in geostationary orbit, roughly 22,000 miles above the 
earth's surface. They detect infrared signatures during missile or space launch boost 
phases and relay this information to various sensor sites and command centers around 
the world. The data is then collected from the sites and evaluated by the Missile 
Warning Center, North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Command located at 
Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station in Colorado, where the threat to North America is 
assessed and distributed to national leadership.
The controllers for this satellite constellation are responsible for performing 
routine checks of the vehicle subsystems via the satellite State of Health (SOH). They 
also perform all satellite commanding, to include orbit adjustments, subsystem tum- 
on/off, and emergency commanding. Most of these subsystems are critical to the health 
and mission performance of the satellite, and failures can result in total mission loss or 
irreparable vehicle damage if not handled correctly and efficiently. The satellite
15
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operators are responsible for ensuring that DSP is physically capable of providing the 
first indications of nuclear attack.
Machines are inherently superior at pattern recognition (color and data), data- 
range checks and data sorting; in the past, older technology systems required the 
human to perform "data supervision" or caretaking. New technology has minimized or 
negated this requirement by improving data display and decision support techniques, 
freeing the human to contribute to the system their unique cognition, intuition, 
experience and troubleshooting abilities. This human knowledge component potentially 
becomes more vital, which is why this study examines the dependence of knowledge on 
decision making with varying levels of uncertainty or non-deterministic situations.
Driskell and Olmstead (1989) describe the military as "the largest employer of 
initially unskilled labor in the nation. Unlike civilian organizations, the DoD does not 
always hire personnel with the required skills. “Personnel are trained and assigned to 
appropriate positions, and these individuals will serve only three to six years in that 
position" (Weimer, 1996). This fact poses a potential problem in the space operations 
community, where the jobs are highly technical and complex. In many cases, personnel 
do not attain a high skill level until the end of their assignments.
Graine (1988) reported that 60 percent of the weapon system life cycle costs are 
related to people or training requirements. His conclusions, based on total cost, 
disagree with the theory of high operator knowledge being necessary. Weimer (1995) 
continues this argument by inferring that considerable savings can be attained if the 
design requirements specify; 1) reduced crew sizes and 2) a reduction in the skill 
required to operate and maintain the system. This method may be adequate for 
simplistic, deterministic systems. However, as the inherent complexity of the system 
increases (air and space systems) and the data becomes more non-deterministic, 
operator knowledge could become even more vital. Although crew reduction may be a
16
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
possible outcome of this experiment, the knowledge required to effectively control the 
system should not be compromised.
When discussing systems of systems (non single-string systems), military 
systems pride themselves on high levels of redundancy to ensure mission success. This 
proves more critical in field operations where survivability is paramount. Luckily, it is 
much easier to build redundancy and survivability into space systems where additional 
personnel are always co-located with the system and new technology enables 
automated commanding and monitoring.
3.2 Design Philosophy
This study will test the "Enhanced" versus “Current” or standard system (Figure 
3.1). This enhanced version involves one expert operator (4+ years experience and 
knowledge in all satellite areas) against the current manning scheme with the standard 
crew of four personnel (1 to 2 years), each with specific knowledge areas. These 
knowledge area include the following: two SSO’s, or Satellite System Operators (two are 
required operationally for vehicle commanding; one is required for state-of-health only), 
one Ground Systems Operator (GSO) and one Spacecraft Engineer (ENG). The test will 
be concerned with assessing how the two systems perform in terms of accuracy, 
efficiency, and personnel cost. Accuracy represents the number of errors committed or 
inability to resolve satellite problems. Efficiency is synonymous with time to resolution, 
and the number of operators required to do the job is a contributor to system cost. 
However, it is important to reiterate that this research does not constitute a crew- 
reduction exercise; it is a study of operator knowledge.
The two primary crew functions that will be studied are: 1) satellite State-of- 
Health (SOH) and 2) planned and contingency commanding. The SOH is performed 
each time the ground station is scheduled to have "contact" with the vehicle before any
17
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action, such as commanding, occurs. Commanding can either be planned (battery 
reconfiguration for eclipses, switching subsystem resources) or contingency based 
(subsystem malfunction, other anomalies).
The satellite SOH process involves a series of approximately seven computer 
displays that present the data in either color-coded mnemonics (representing various 
subsystem components, such as battery temperatures, etc.), telemetry patterns, pure 
numerical values, and numerical ranges. Due to extensive data saturation and human 
involvement in the data monitoring process, there is present risk of human error with the 
current design. Although not a part of this research, one consideration for system 
redesign involves displaying only out-of-limit data points; points within limits are 
considered nominal and could be eliminated from the initial viewed display (Chapter 7). 
However, as there are no display limitations, the operator will always have the ability to 
access and display any telemetry data desired. This will greatly minimize the time and 
personnel required for routine status checks for anomalous conditions.
For satellite commanding, command plan checklists exist for several possible 
anomalies or system reconfigurations. These command plans involve the operator 
manually typing and sending each command to the satellite. The incorrect command 
sent at an inopportune time can have disastrous effects on the vehicle. This risk could 
be mitigated by methods that will be discussed in later chapters.
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The crew structure consists of a minimum of three people for a nominal commanding 
support. For anomalous conditions, an engineer is added to the “crew”, making the total 
crew requirement of four. In this study, the standard level crews will consist of the four 
individuals whose positions and associated responsibilities are detailed in the following 
sections.
3.3.1 Satellite System Operator (SSO). The SSO is liable for any problems that arise 
with the satellite. This individual is responsible for monitoring the satellite state of health 
and subsystem operability. The SSO's talk directly to the ARTS (Automated Remote 
Tracking Station) operator to verify that command uplinks and satellite downlinks are 
active and data is being received. This is the only position permitted to perform direct 
commanding to the satellite. There is only one SSO required for a nominal SOH 
support, and two required for any commanding support.
3.3.2 Ground System Components (GSO). The GSO does not interface with any of the 
satellite components, but instead ensures that the data and voice links from the 
worldwide Automated Remote Tracking Station (ARTS) network to the local terminals 
are operating properly. In the scenarios constructed for the study, the GSO position has 
nominal interface with the ground segment; no variation or additional inputs were 
presented within the ground equipment.
3.3.3 Spacecraft Engineer (ENG). The engineer is the Air Force’s resident satellite 
system expert. They reside on station for roughly 3 years (the first year is spent in 
training), so the expertise gained is limited to witnessed anomalies, on-the-job training
20
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and knowledge passed from senior engineers. The engineer is present during day shift, 
but is also on 24 hour call for anomalies and problems. The time criticality of some 
failure resolution makes this a less-than-optimal situation for the crews when performing 
contingency anomaly troubleshooting. The engineers, in most cases, consult with on­
site contractor personnel during anomaly detection. In addition to the local contractors, 
there is occasionally a need to confer with the production plant satellite subsystem 
specialists and designers.
3.4.4 Expert Operator. The "expert" operator for this study had a mean experience level 
of seven years. This level of expertise included mastery of the GSO, SSO, and ENG 
functions. Additional skills included mission planning, orbital analysis, and detailed 
system knowledge. They could act autonomously in reconfiguring the satellite and 
substituting redundant components. Their knowledge encompassed not only the 
satellite bus, but all vehicle payloads.
The system comparisons, crew design and assumptions and constraints 
associated with the design will be detailed in later chapters.
21
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Chapter 4
METHODOLOGY
The methodology outlined in this section describes the various phases followed 
in the study development.
4.1 Related Research
4.1.1 General Considerations. It was determined that a number of scenarios would be 
run between two crews of different knowledge levels (expert and standard) and 
performance factors would be compared. However, the steps below had to be followed 
prior to experiment design.
• Ensure parameters are clearly defined and ascertain which are constant or 
variable
• Verify that objectives are testable and establish criterion of success for each 
item
• Examine hypotheses, determine validity, and verify good test cases
4.1.2 Other Studies. Background cases and studies were also examined to see how 
well they fit within the guidelines of this research. There have been many operator 
studies performed, but few of them fall within the purview of the objectives stated in 
Chapter 1.
Jones and Mitchell (1995), in their research of Goddard Space Flight Center 
Satellite Flight Operations Teams, collected performance and subjective data from the 
crews on satellite ground control tasks. Eight subjects were presented seven scenario 
sessions, where the main variable was the absence or presence of the operator
22
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assistant software designed to aid the operator in task reminders and decision making. 
Their experiment held operator knowledge constant and level of automation and 
assistance provided by the system as variable. Results found that most operators were 
surprisingly confident in allocating tasks to the software. Some reasons for this 
phenomenon were that operators were aware that in a simulation environment there 
were no consequences for poor decision making. Also, they were cognizant that one 
objective was to test the software and its capabilities. The software exhibited no failures 
in interface or automation and performed functions with virtually no time delay. In sum, 
the researchers showed that the assistant software was perceived by the operators to 
“be useful and provided benefits for certain portions of the control task".
Kerstolt et al. (1996) performed a similar operator study with disturbances rated 
on complexity where either of two options were available: one disturbance was present 
(complexity 1), or two or three simultaneously (Complexities 2 and 3). Limited time was 
available to resolve these anomalies. However, their subjects were all inexperienced 
novices and were of the same knowledge level. Kerstolt's group demonstrated that 
participants had tendencies of ignoring the monitoring functions as disturbances or 
anomalies occurred. Additionally, there was evidence of what the researchers described 
as “cognitive lockup": once complex diagnosis began, operators ignored the opportunity 
to stabilize additional, simpler system faults and tended not to interrupt the original 
troubleshooting process.
Elvers et al. (1993) produced a factorial experiment similar to the one presented 
in Chapter 5 (Experiment Design), measuring reaction time and absolute error with 
students of the same level of knowledge. This variation is similar to that of Kerstolt’s 
(1996) study, concentrating on overall performance with no variation of operator 
knowledge. The research focused on operators performing tasks requiring either 
information integration (integral) tasks or separable tasks, and probabilities of integral
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task occurrence were controlled. Results showed that when the probability of integral 
task was increased, absolute error increased for the separable task but remained 
constant for the integral task. As probability of the integral task increased, reaction time 
dropped abruptly for the integral task but elevated slowly for the separable task.
None of these cited research efforts focused on variation of operator knowledge, 
complexity of task, or comparison group performance in those tasks.
4.2 Experiment Design
it was first necessary to determine how many operator groups would be 
necessary, as well as how many scenarios would be run in order to distinguish 
significant differences between the groups. Details on this process are available in the 
following chapter (Experiment Design). The results dictated that 15 scenarios would be 
run between 4 groups (two expert and two standard groups for a balanced design with 
replicates). The study necessitates collecting continuous data (time to resolve), binomial 
data (resolved/not resolved), and subjective data using the Subjective Workload 
Assessment Technique (SWAT).
4.3 Resources
An assessment of the required resources was made. This project was extremely 
difficult in terms of the extensive coordination required between multiple agencies and 
the scheduling difficulties involved in working with an operational space squadron. To 
intensify the problem, numbers of available subjects able to participate due to job 
constraints were limited. However, these challenges merely required more development 
and coordination time to overcome.
The following resources were divided into two categories:
24
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4.3.1 Personnel. A total of ten participants (volunteers) were required to construct the 
following groups:
• Two Standard Crews - Eight 1 SOPS operators of the proper job specialty and 
experience level. Each standard crew of four requires two Satellite System 
Operators (SSO), one Ground Systems Operator (GSO), and one DSP Vehicle 
Engineer (ENG).
• Two Expert Crews - Each of the two expert crews will consist of one high- 
knowledge level operator who will perform all satellite functions (SSO, GSO, and 
ENG).
4.3.2 Equipment.
• The appropriate DSP simulator for simulation purposes. This simulator should 
ideally support real-time anomaly injection, should not be code-intensive, and should 
be flexible enough to adjust to the dynamics of these unique scenarios. Most 
importantly, it should be capable of emulating the current ground system equipment.
• A DSP, Phase III vehicle database loaded for simulation purposes.
• Approval by 1 SOPS to use the above resources to include scenario execution and a 
brief training session for operator system usage.
Approval to use these resources had to be gained prior to further study development.
4.4 Scenario Development
After designing the experiment and determining the required resources, scenario 
development could begin. The spacecraft anomalies would be randomly injected into 
the scenarios, selecting one of each type (Type 1, 2, or 3) per scenario. The anomaly 
bank was comprised of more than 100 possible satellite states, and the number of 
anomalies statistically required drove the number of scenarios needed. Simulation 
game rules, in addition to timekeeping/logging methods were also outlined. The 
following items were created for each scenario after the anomalies were randomly 
assigned:
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• A timeline for each scenario
• Scenario script
• Expected Courses of Action (COAs) to be taken for each anomaly, to include 
satellite signature, necessary commands, resulting satellite effects, and 
signatures of incorrect commanding
• Associated command plans for execution
• Satellite pass plans, technical documentation, and other materials typically 
required by the crews and engineers to perform their jobs
Scenario anomalies involved the three forms of malfunctions listed in the paragraphs 
below.
4.4.1 Vehicle Anomalies. The first step was to examine any available historical data for 
possible anomalies. This included a list of all potential anomalies and suspected 
causes. Extensive data was not readily available, so contractor personnel with system 
longevity were sought for additional information. Unfortunately, many anomalous 
conditions modeled in the study are rare, so roughly one year was spent analyzing 
vehicle technical publications and diagrams to anticipate the satellite signatures that 
would occur as a result of these anomalies. After a complete list was formed according 
to system publications and historical data, correlations were determined between 
anomalies and sub-system mnemonics (parameters). Roughly 1000 mnemonics 
(satellite measurands or parameters) exist for the vehicle, and 653 are currently 
displayed to the operators by the system. The remaining mnemonics compiled derived 
(non-displayed) parameters.
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4.4.2 Soace Environment. Space environment can play a large role in satellite 
malfunctions. Unfortunately, it is difficult to attribute many failures to space environment, 
since how space environment affects vehicles is highly non-deterministic and still under 
scientific study. Although the design process takes into account modeling of these 
characteristics, it is difficult to fully simulate effects in a laboratory environment. Some 
major influences include solar wind/storms and geomagnetic changes and cycles. 
These phenomena manifest themselves in the form of telemetry bit-flips, activation of 
event alarms and similar effects.
4.4.3 Electro-Maanetic Interference (EMI). Since Electro Magnetic Interference can be 
instigated accidentally or intentionally, it was necessary to determine the frequency of 
both forms. Intentional EMI can be simple to detect, but very difficult to resolve or repair, 
and Space Control (denying enemy access to satellite assets) enters into the process 
when considering these cases. Unintentional EMI might typify a Type 1 anomaly, while 
intentional denial (Space Control) could be the equivalent of a Type 3 anomaly.
4.5 Crew Selection
As mentioned in section 4.3, a total of ten volunteers were required for the study. 
The crewmembers for the standard group were randomly sampled from the total 
available standard knowledge level operators available to participate in the 1st Space 
Operations Squadron. A survey was conducted for crew personnel to determine 
average time spent performing the job on the current system. This equated to the mean 
experience level for the control group, which was approximately two year’s experience 
on the system.
The same was done for the test (expert) group, where the experience level 
established for the expert group with an extensive satellite engineering background was
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approximately 7 years (with a range of 5 to 10 vears). For the expert group, there was 
an exceptionally small cadre of individuals who would be considered to fall into this 
category. Subsequently, it was impossible to sample randomly from such a small 
population; these members were merely selected.
Human Subject Protection concerns were also addressed. Coordination with the 
1st Space Operations Squadron was designed to solicit volunteers for the standard crew 
force. There was no employment risk in project participation since the study had 
leadership support. The expert crew members were also volunteers, and they 
participated outside normal work hours. The crews had enthusiastic commitment and 
held a stake in the experiment results; they were aware that the outcome would affect 
future system design and subsequently their day-to-day operations. They were 
comprised of the best operators available and took the tasks seriously. The fact that 
they were volunteers demonstrated that they had dedication and made personal 
investment in the study.
Once the all participants were designated, they were provided with the SWAT 
card sort exercise. This exercise involved sorting through 27 cards and classifying these 
cards into perceived task difficulty categories. This method enables development of a 
scale based on the individual operators. The dynamic scaling enables quick collection of 
subjective data following the scenarios. More detail on the SWAT technique may be 
found in Chapter 5.
Each volunteer spent no more than 15 hours for simulations, and 4 hours in total 
to complete subjective task surveys. The crews were requested to attend a 30-minute 
pre-brief/training session at study start and a 15-minute out-brief at the study conclusion. 
Subjective task surveys focused only on perceived task difficulty and task ratings; no 
further data was collected from these surveys.
28
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
There was no race or sex criteria in subject selection. Furthermore, race or sex 
of study participants was not recorded or referenced in any way. Crew members were 
only designated according to group membership ("expert" or "standard”). The standard 
crews also have specialty positions designated, such as SSO, GSO, or ENG. Personal 
information other than group membership (expert or standard knowledge level) and 
approximate experience level/specialty was not used in this study. Extraneous 
information (name, sex of subject, etc.) has no contribution to the research and was not 
recorded or included in any associated study documentation.
Authorization from the Institutional Review Board may be found in Appendix B 
(Institutional Review Board Approval). The use of human subjects in this study has been 
approved by the University of New Hampshire Institutional Review Board for the 
Protection of Human Subjects in Research.
4.6 Scenario Validation
All scenarios were validated on the simulator prior to execution. This occurred 
over a two-week period in March 2001. Care was taken to ensure the scenarios 
functioned properly -  minimal inputs were not easily replicated on the emulator. Manual 
inputs (real-time change of satellite mnemonics) were necessary for the items not 
automatically modeled by the emulator, while verbal inputs were needed for items the 
simulator was unable to replicate. These functions were identified well ahead of time so 
the scripts could be restructured and investigator tasks could be assigned to make 
presentation standardized and seamless.
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4.7 Scenario Execution
4.7.1 Timekeeping/Recording. As a backup method to manual timekeeping, each 
scenario was videotaped during execution so that time criteria could be re-validated and 
data could be accessed if necessary.
4.7.2 Randomization. Scenarios were run in a random order to minimize the potential 
for investigator learning, or improving scenario presentation due to repetition. The 
statistical software program, JMP, provided a random scenario scheme for all four 
crews. This scenario order is available in Chapter 5.
4.7.3 Crew Alertness. Effort was also made to ensure all crews functioned at 
approximately the same level of alertness. Ideally, the scenarios would be run for one 
crew each day, at the same time every day. However, resources in terms of the actual 
crewmember availability and emulator time did not make this a feasible option. 
Therefore, it was carefully ensured that within time-of-day constraints (morning or 
afternoon), the crews were similarly rested and alert. To guard against variation in 
alertness, scenario execution was restricted to the afternoon hours, ranging from 1200 to 
1600.
4.7.4 Scenano Format. The scenarios were divided into three sections of pre-brief, 
scenario, out-brief/survey completion. Samples of the scenario flow to include the 
scenario script, briefings, and survey can be seen in Appendix D (Sample Scenario 
Format). In each situation, the starting status of the scenario was presented to the 
crews to include the current satellite status and the goals to be accomplished in the 
scenario. For all scenarios it was generally the same, with the exception of initial 
satellite state. Following the scenario, a short out-brief included thanking the crew and
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distributing the subjective surveys. For phase one of the survey, the crew was 
questioned as to what were the three anomalies. Following this phase, the correct three 
anomalies were confirmed to ensure they could complete the SWAT portion of the 
survey correctly.
4.7.5 Investigators. Two investigators collected the data and interfaced with the crew 
members. The primary investigator was the Ph.D. candidate, and the investigator 
assistant was a member of the Center for Research Support (CERES) at Schriever AFB, 
CO. Both investigators were operationally qualified in the case study system. They are 
also members of the Air Force Reserve component providing operational support to the 
1 SOPS and have backgrounds in human machine interface design and human factors.
4.8 Scenario Results and Data Analysis
Upon collating the scenario results, the following data was interpreted:
4.8.1 Continuous Time and Binomial Data. Results may be found in the data 
presentation section (Chapter 6).
4.8.2 Anomaly Type Categorization. Although this will be discussed in more detail in 
the data presentation, generally the goal was to statistically determine what level of 
training and experience is required to identify and complete each Type (1, 2, and 3) of 
task(s) correctly and within time constraints. This data can aid in assessing anomaly 
difficulties, it can also illustrate what commanding functions lend themselves well to 
automation and which require extensive human knowledge and intuition. An associated 
goal is to formalize conclusions on the required knowledge level needed to perform 
certain operations. The findings can provide decision-makers with the ability to make
31
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
knowledgeable choices on who should operate the system, at what level of expertise, 
and to identify the risk associated with the different choices of operator skill.
4.8.3 Subjective Measures. Subjective measures aid in evaluating anomaly difficulty, 
since time data is only one descriptor. Combining both data types create a more 
complete measurement of task difficulty. The Subjective Workload Assessment 
Technique (SWAT) data was collected via survey, and results may be found in the data 
presentation section.
4.9 Current System Improvement
Systems slated for improvement in terms of display formats and automation 
based on the scenario results are being tested at CERES. These systems are 
developed by applying Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) ground system philosophies 
versus the specialized, costly equipment widely used for current military satellite 
command and control. The current system used in 1 SOPS is the same system 
emulated in this study by the Crew Training Emulator (CTE) simulators. Designed in the 
early 1970’s, yearly cost sustainment now approaches $50 million. Conversely, COTS 
systems adopt virtually “throw-away” technology, where the sustainment costs are 
covered by the vendor for the approximately three-year maintenance contract. After that 
period, the system is discarded and upgraded to the new capability. In this manner, 
customers/users are assured possession of the latest in technology and capability, while 
minimizing sustainment and maintenance costs.
The outcome of this research will drive the creation of new, enhanced, user- 
friendly and more informative HMI screens for an optimal user. In addition, the first part 
of the study will dictate what functions of satellite commanding should be automated, 
and which should be only minimally automated to ensure human intervention. Based on
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this project, it is the hope that future design of space systems will be driven by 
humanistic factors and not by machine hardware or software.
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The following paragraphs detail the test process. In earlier chapters, there was 
brief mention of performance criteria. Accuracy, efficiency, and cost were noted as the 
discriminating parameters for gauging system success and operator performance. To 
explain further, accuracy translates into minimal number of errors, or success rate and 
efficiency equates to time required to resolve the anomaly. Financial cost contributes to 
determining which system can do the job the best for the least cost. Since one of the 
highest system expenses is attributed to operator costs, it follows that the expert 
operator system should be less costly to operate, given that it effectively provides the 
other two factors of efficiency and accuracy.
For example, a model outlined by Rohles (1988) describes performance and 
productivity. His model, derived from the learning theory of Clark Hull (1943) describes 
this relationship as:
P = A * D + O,
where
P = Performance 
A = Ability 
D = Drive
O = Oscillatory factor, comprised of five factors: selection, training, 
supervision, communication, and environment.
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The “oscillatory" factor is a sizable but imprecise effect, and difficult to assess the most 
important contributor. Training is a tremendous issue in military satellite operations; 
most operators spend the majority of time on station in some form of training 
environment. Selection and environment encompass a wide spectrum of variables, such 
as human background, personality, and education level. It has been shown that 
education can positively affect performance levels (Huey, et at.. 1992), even if it does not 
pertain to knowledge specific to the task. Better performance was associated with 
higher education (college degree versus high school) in an untrained system task 
randomly assigned across study participants.
5.2 Experiment Description
In this experiment, each crew (from knowledge groups “expert" and “standard”) 
was subjected to a series of 15 scenarios containing three anomalies each, totaling 45 
anomalies. Running four groups through each of the 15 scenarios resulted in 180 
observations. The scenarios were one hour in length and of identical content among all 
crews. Anomalies were presented to the crew as the scenario began through errors 
displayed on the satellite telemetry frames. The crew teams tried to 1) identify, 2) 
prioritize, and 3) resolve/correct the anomalies within the scenario length. A time value 
was recorded upon resolution (or attempted resolution) of each anomaly. Those 
anomalies not resolved within the scenario time-span had a censored time value 
recorded equivalent to the difference between time at the end of the scenario and 
initiation time. The lead investigator who has 6 years of system experience determined 
the one hour time period. A typical, nominal satellite support lasts only 10 minutes, and 
would normally be extended in the event of an anomaly. Thirty minutes was then 
chosen as the scenario duration, but there was concern of this not being adequate time
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to address all three problems. Therefore, a sixty minute scenario was determined to be 
satisfactory for the crews to prioritize and resolve the anomalies.
5.3 Assumptions and Constraints
5.3.1 General Assumptions and Constraints.
• No changes in machine technology occurred in the study
• Two expert crews and two standard crews were tested to provide data replication 
and a balanced experiment design. Race or sex was not considered in crew 
selection
• An expert crew consists of one operator able to perform all satellite 
functions
* Selected expert operators have an average of seven years experience in 
DSP command, control and engineering of DSP systems
■ Each standard crew consists of four operators, each individual 
possessing anywhere from six months to three years of operations 
experience on DSP systems
• The 15 scenarios are comprised of three satellite vehicle anomalies of increasing 
difficulty levels. Scenarios had one of each type 1, 2 and 3 anomaly difficulty 
levels that were presented simultaneously at the beginning of the scenario. 
Crews prioritized these as appropriate at the beginning of the satellite support.
• This project was completely dependent on using a simulator capable of 
emulating the DSP-I telemetry and commanding environment
• Data collection had to be completed prior to operational transition of the 1 SOPS. 
Test subjects for the standard knowledge base must be drawn from this 
operations center
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The only factor permitted to vary was operator knowledge level between the crews. This 
study could potentially be construed as a crew-reduction study, but it is not. Crew 
reduction may be an experimental result, but cannot be concluded without data analysis.
5.3.2 Positional Aliasing. Positional aliasing describes a possible outcome where the 
lower level knowledge crew could out-perform the expert crew merely by having more 
crew members. This implies that there could be aliasing of crew positions where there is 
perceived overlap between the engineering tasks and satellite operator tasks. After 
careful consideration, it was determined that aliasing would not be a factor. The primary 
reason is attributed to the operational structure imposed by the military for basic satellite 
operations. The only individuals who are authorized to access the keyboards and enter 
commands are the SSO position. Engineers, by job specialization, are not permitted to 
touch the operator consoles or perform commanding. Moreover, only one SSO is 
granted control of the contact, meaning one console is designated as the commanding 
console that can command the satellite. In addition, the SSOs have no exposure to any 
of the satellite technical documentation, and would therefore provide negligible aid to the 
engineers in researching subsystem characteristics.
This format of designated operator roles, although lending itself well to this 
experiment in terms of minimizing other undesirable effects of aliasing, is not the most 
efficient to run satellite operations. As shown in the research of Urban et al. (1992), 
“specialized” (non-hierarchicaily structured) teams were in all cases, regardless of 
workload, at an advantage over non-specialized, hierarchical teams. Urban’s research 
case study used five-member teams to achieve this conclusion.
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5.3.3 Ground System Operator (GSO) Position. The GSO position required 
considerable examination, namely on how team dynamics were influenced and what role 
they would have in the study. First, the GSO provided no satellite vehicle expertise to 
the crew. More important, since the ground segment functions nominally with no 
variation, there were essentially no inputs for the GSO. Initially, there was a desire to 
remove them from the crew dynamics altogether since there were concerns of this 
position becoming a distracter either due to member inactivity or individual boredom. 
However, there were two more pressing concerns: 1) the possible effect on crew 
dynamics, and 2) alteration of the standard crew structure and generalization of the 
study results of a crew of three versus a typical crew of four. The compromise reached 
was that the GSO would be present during the typical contact portion, or SOH phase. 
During this phase of the scenarios, each anomaly is ascertained to be either vehicle 
related or ground related (ground segment does not vary). After the GSO completes his 
function(s), he may depart the study environment. In this way, the crew integrity is 
maintained, but any opportunity for the GSO to be a crew detriment is minimized. The 
GSO provided no subjective or continuous data for use in the experiment, and did not 
participate in the closing subjective surveys.
5.4 Research Questions
The questions the study attempted to address are:
1. Can satellite anomalies be effectively categorized into three distinct types 
(according to difficulty) so that they can be used to guide automation of future 
space systems?
2. Is the difference in anomaly resolution accuracy between the two knowledge 
levels statistically significant? Accuracy refers to anomalies that were correctly
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resolved. Only anomalies solved accurately were considered “resolved" and 
given a resolution time.
3. Is the difference in anomaly resolution efficiency between the two knowledge 
levels statistically significant? Efficiency is defined by resolution time.
4. Are there differences at the 95% confidence level among the six treatments 
(specific main effect combinations, anomaly type by knowledge level 
interactions)?
5. Are there differential effects of knowledge level across the anomaly types on 
error resolution in both accuracy and efficiency?
6. Does higher knowledge level result in:
• a more accurate system based on fewer errors?
• a more efficient system based on less time required to resolve 
anomalies?
• a lower cost system based on fewer operators required?
5.5 Factors
Variables completely controlled by the experimenter are factors. In this 
experiment, there are two factors. One factor is knowledge type, which has two levels; 
high knowledge and low knowledge. The other factor is type of anomaly, having 3 
levels: Type 1 (easy to resolve), Type 2 (intermediate difficulty), and Type 3 (difficult). 
Combining these two factors leads to a 2-by-3 factorial experiment. With this form of 
experiment, the effects of combining the factor levels can be investigated, forming
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2 X 3  = 6 treatments. Treatments define specific combinations of factor levels.
5.6 Raw data response variables
Two response variables were measured. They are:
1. Accuracy: Was the anomaly resolved?
• Measurement of either 0 (not resolved) or 1 (resolved)
• This response has binomial characteristics
• Measuring the binomial response is commonly used to enable 
identification of censored (missing) observations
2. Efficiency: Time to resolve the anomaly
• Raw time values are measured as a continuous variable
• Censoring occurs if the anomaly is not resolved during the scenario
• Cox’s Proportional Hazards Models were used to analyze the data. 
This technique is commonly used to analyze censored (missing) data
To further explain the two responses, the response variables were measured according 
to the team either resolving the anomaly (success = 1) or not resolving the anomaly 
(failure = 0) within the 60-minute satellite support. This was the binomial response of the 
anomaly being either resolved or not resolved. As it turns out, due to the fact that 97% 
of anomalies were resolved, the binomial data was not very useful other than to provide 
information on censored responses that could be used in continuous time data analysis.
Continuous time data provided the most information on each crew’s ability to 
resolve anomalies. Time to resolve was recorded for each of the three anomaly types 
during the scenarios. If a particular anomaly was not resolved, a censored time value of
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the difference between scenario termination time and initiation time was recorded for the 
continuous response variable of time. This potential for occurrence of censored data 
leads to the use of Survival Analysis techniques. Cox’s Proportional Hazards models 
were specifically applied since they account for censored observations, and model 
assumptions were satisfied. Cox’s models use the censored data in an unbiased 
manner so that information is not lost in the analysis. Model specifics will be discussed 
in section 5.10.3.
A single scenario consisted of three anomalies, one of each difficulty type. All 
three anomalies were presented simultaneously upon scenario initiation. Essentially, 
there were three time measurements per scenario (representing the three anomalies), 
but occasionally these consisted of a mixture of measured and censored times. The 
process by which the team conducted anomaly resolution originated from the priority it 
assigned to each task; this is a realistic approach, since that is how crews conduct 
troubleshooting in practice. Therefore, the time recorded for each anomaly was 
dependent on the time the crew dedicated to resolving each of the three before 1) they 
solved the problem, 2) they gave up (resulting in censored time), or 3) the scenario 
ended (also resulting in censored time). There was no instance where the crew actually 
“gave up" -  in all cases, the crews attempted resolution until the scenario time ended.
The scenario ground rules dictated notification by the crew lead of their intentions 
(priority and when they decided to give up and move on to the next anomaly), and this 
time was recorded exactly to second accuracy. The priority assigned to the anomalies 
did not necessarily mean that there was a set order in which the anomalies were 
resolved. However, more often than not, Type 1’s were always assigned priority one. 
The process of priority assignment was a product of formal training and established 
military guidelines.
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5.7 Sample Size Determination
Two approaches were considered in sample size determination.
5.7.1 Binomial (measurement of “success" or “failure”). In the section below, the goal 
was to find the sample size required to estimate a treatment proportion with a bound on 
error of 0.1. Here, it is assumed that the probability of successful anomaly resolution is 
p = 0.5, giving the most conservative sample size.
The equation used solves for n, the required sample size for a predetermined e, 
the maximum error of the point estimate y/n. For a 95% confidence level, the 
corresponding Z value is 1.96. Inserting the appropriate values, the sample size per 
treatment is determined as
n = Zi/22 / 4 e2 = (1.96)214 (0.1)2 = 96.04 * 97 anomalies.
Recall that this is the required sample size per treatment for precise estimation of the 
given treatment proportion. Considerations of either two, three, or six treatments are of 
interest to compare the two knowledge levels, compare the three types of anomalies 
(which might include simply comparing Types 2 and 3), and compare all six knowledge 
levei-by-type combinations. These comparisons would require as many as 582 
observations.
An interesting point is that there were only six censored observations overall (out 
of 180 total observations), making a final binomial analysis not as useful as initially 
expected. However, binomial considerations were helpful during the initial experiment 
development phase in terms of exploring necessary sample size and expected resource 
needs.
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5.7.2 Continuous time data.
5.7.2.1 Methodology. The time to resolve was measured directly in simulator system 
time in seconds. As mentioned earlier, there were three time measurements per 
scenario (representing the three anomalies), but occasionally these consisted of a 
mixture of measured and censored times. Each typed command was displayed on the 
screen so that keystroke tracking was simple and exact. Times recorded were 
representative of the crews either resolving the problem or the scenario terminating 
(resulting in censored time). Times were manually recorded by two investigators and 
were backed up by video.
5.7.2.2 Sample size determination. The first step for sample size determination for 
the continuous time data is to estimate the standard deviation. This was based on the 
shortest and longest likely times required to resolve an anomaly. A typical, conservative 
estimate of standard deviation is range *  4; a less conservative estimate is range ^ 6. 
Both of these are based on properties of the normal distribution. Rather than predict the 
resolution range, the standard deviation was estimated as the scenario length (60 
minutes) divided by the effective range of the standard normal distribution (6). The 
estimate of standard deviation for the experiment that was determined in this fashion 
was ct « 10 minutes (600 seconds). (As it turned out, this value of sigma was consistent 
with the root mean squared error (RMSE) of 620 seconds resulting from the actual 
analysis of variance performed for comparisons of type and knowledge.) Sample sizes 
were determined to ensure detection of a pre-specified difference of delta with 
probability p -  0.90 when one is using an a = 0.05 level significance test.
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Results were recorded for a test set of continuous data for 2 and 6 groups in the 
statistical program JMP IN. It is important to note that for this type of analysis, JMP IN 
assumes equal stratum sizes. The Design of Experiments analysis tool was used to 
confirm hand-calculated sample size estimates. In the calculations, <7 and 5 were set to 
10 minutes and 7 minutes, respectively. These estimates were based on a power of 
90% and the sigma and delta values defined above to find the number of anomalies 
required, or n. The raw data is included in Appendix A, and the results are listed in the 
next section.
5.7.2.3 Sample size results. After examining the binomial and continuous data results, 
it seemed prudent in terms of resources and time considerations (to minimize 
operational impact to the squadron) to follow the values outlined in the continuous 
approach for sample size as opposed to the binomial trials. The binomial calculations, as 
expected, yielded large sample sizes (the 97 samples calculated were per treatment). 
However, the values obtained through JMP for the continuous data were much more 
reasonable. The conclusion is that for a significance level of a = 0.05, a power of 90%, 
and accompanying sigmas and deltas of 10 and 7, respectively, comparing the two 
knowledge-levels requires roughly 86 anomalies total, or 43 per group. This translates 
into almost 15 scenarios with 3 anomalies contained in each scenario. By increasing the 
delta to 10, the number of anomalies required per group dropped to 44, or 22 
observations per group. These calculations were performed using the equation (which is 
only applicable in a two-sample situation) (Ostle, et al., 1988):
n = 2 1Z\» + Z'n]W
82
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where Z and Z‘p are the respective areas of a/2 (1.960) and p (1.282) from the 
normal tables student's t-test tables. Calculations were also confirmed using tables 
produced by Davies (1956), where the difference, D = 5 / a is calculated and matched to 
the level of t-test to determine approximate sample sizes based on a specified power 
and significance level. These sample size calculations were also verified using JMP, 
again showing that n *  88, or n = 44 anomalies per group were necessary to detect a 
difference of 5 = 7.
Sample Size
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Figure 5.1: JMP Sample Size Determination for Comparison of Two Treatments
For computing required sample sizes for 6 treatments, the method is more 
complex. An iterative approach can be used (Montgomery, 1991; Scheffe, 1959) that 
approximates sample size per cell (or group).
< & =  [ t f  / ( 2 a t f ) ] n
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The term D represents the maximum difference one wishes to detect. Using the 
equation above with the same value of sigma and selecting 7 units as the maximum 
difference (0) to detect, the cell sizes were determined for a conservative size for n. 
Pearson and Hartley charts were then used to determine that a sample size of roughly 
70 per group (420 total) would result in a power of approximately 0.925.
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Figure 5.2: JMP Sample Size Determination for Comparison of Six Treatments
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Through JMP, it was also possible to verify the calculations for sample sizes 
necessary to determine differences in six groups for the six different treatment cases 
(Figure 5.2). For an a of 0.05, the number of samples required for a = 10, D = 7 were 
248 observations total, or 42 per group. Figure 5.3 shows the comparisons of these 
results.
Treatments Binomial Sample Size Continuous Sample Size
(a = 0.05, 5 (or D) = 7, c = 10)
2 194 (97 per group) 88 (44 per group)
3 291 • JMP gives 120, 40 per group.
• Not calculated (44<n<82)
6 582 • JMP gives 248, 42 per group.
• Calculations give 490 (82 per group)
Figure 5.3: Sample Size Determination Comparison for Binomial and
Continuous Data
One problem encountered was the ability to code this many scenarios and have the 
crews execute them; the resources required would be too taxing on the operations 
squadron. The final decision was to use 15 scenarios, containing 3 anomalies per 
scenario to be executed by 4 crews. This resulted in 45 observations per group, or 180 
observations total. This appeared adequate to detect differences between the two 
groups (minimum n required was 44 per group), and most likely between the six groups 
(depending on the actual standard deviation). Therefore, the experiment schedule was 
adjusted to construct 15 scenarios, which was more reasonable for manpower support 
requests and time dedicated to scenario construction. Each scenario required a
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minimum of one month for development (1.5 years for all 15), and the scenario validation 
period for all simulations was two months.
5.8 Subjective Measures
Subjective data was also collected from the participants. The technique selected 
was the Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT), which was developed by 
Brooks AFB Aeromedical Research Center. This method was selected from among 
those similar techniques, to include Modified Cooper-Harper, NASA-TLX, Paired 
Comparison Method for Interval Scaling (Turner, 1996) and the SWORD method. Most 
of these techniques in the past have been heavily applied to military operational task 
assessment -  most often through aircraft pilot studies. All would have been suited to 
some degree to this study since satellite operations and aircraft operations have virtually 
identical characteristics.
Rueb, et al. (1994) used both the SWAT and SWORD techniques to assess 
aircrew subjective performance in a crew reduction application. SWORD was used in 
Rueb's study to further decompose the tasks. They praised the effectiveness of both 
techniques; however, the SWORD application was deemed unnecessary in this 
experiment. For this research, the additional set of measurands was not needed, as 
only the task of the anomaly resolution was of interest and not the separate actions that 
comprised the process. Hammer, et al. (1996) also used the SWAT method since it was 
designed by the Armstrong Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory to obtain subjective 
data from pilots in aircraft experiments. Consequently, it lent itself to this type of study 
also since “flying” satellites is acknowledged as being similar as flying aircraft.
Hendy, Hamilton, and Landry (1993) tested comparative effectiveness of the 
NASA-TLX and SWAT rating scales. Both techniques are multi-dimensional methods, 
and both exhibit similar characteristics and behavior. The methods incorporate scaling
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procedures for combining the results of a number of individual factor judgements into a 
single (scalar) index of overall workload. One drawback to SWAT is that it has slightly 
less sensitivity than TLX, which was also confirmed by Battiste and Bortulussi's (1988) 
research. However, SWAT requires less participant effort in completing surveys since 
the scaling is performed prior to data collection, an advantage when resources are only 
available for minimal time.
SWAT, in essence, provides a measure of subjective workload, which is defined 
as the orthogonal dimensions of time load (T), mental effort load (E), and psychological 
stress load (S). The two phases of SWAT development are the scale development 
phase and the event scoring phase. The SWAT method requires an initial sort of 27 
cards to be performed by the scenario participants. This card sort is used to develop the 
scale used to rate the subjective measures collected upon completion of the scenarios. 
These scaling factors are translated into interval scales for each participant to define a 
single metric of workload, and are developed prior to data collection. The scale used 
can be a group scale assuming that the entire subject pool has a high level of agreement 
in perceived difficulty elements (Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance > 0.75). Using 
one scale for the entire group simplifies analysis considerably; however, individual 
scales can be developed for each subject if necessary. This scale rescales difficulty 
levels of events into a single numbers ranging from one to 100. Following scale 
development, the event data can be collected from the participant rating satellite 
anomalies in terms of the three dimensions defined above. More specifically, each of 
the three anomalies in every scenario has three ratings: levels 1, 2, or 3 in terms of time 
load (T), mental effort load (E), and psychological stress load (S). This data is then 
analyzed according to the interval scale of workload units and anomaly difficulty user 
ratings.
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5.9 Study Design
The following section outlines specifics of study design, from the general process
to particular details unique to the project.
5.9.1 Process. The following section details the step-by-step approach taken to the
experiment.
1. Determine and list all possible anomalies under consideration. This was performed 
with the help of TRW, AEROJET, and Air Force personnel.
2. Group the anomalies into “Type” groups. Although this will be performed “a priori" as 
part of the study, this step is necessary in order to ensure anomaly complexity is 
evenly distributed throughout the scenarios.
3. Sample each of the “Type" groups to select the anomalies for injection into the 
scenarios. Create scenarios out of the randomly selected anomalies of the total N 
anomalies grouped into 3 type groups. Each scenario should contain R (selected as 
3) anomalies per scenario. Random selection of anomalies was performed using the 
JMP statistics software “shuffle" option.
4. Create S (selected as 15) scenarios.
5. Total number of scenarios executed equaled X (15 scenarios * 4 groups = 60) trials 
for both groups A (expert knowledge level) and B (standard knowledge level). The 
same scenarios must be run for both groups in random order, and scenarios were 
randomized using the JMP software.
6. Identified signatures for each anomaly included in the scenario: how the anomaly is 
represented to operators on the telemetry screens. This was the most time 
consuming portion of the experiment, as in-depth satellite engineering knowledge 
was required to accomplish scenario design. Development involved use of vehicle
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wiring diagrams to anticipate how the signature would appear and what command 
sequences were necessary to remedy the problems.
7. Construct the simulations and code them into the simulator. This was performed on 
the crew Training Emulators designed to simulate the existing 1 SOPS operational 
system.
8. Test and verify all scenarios.
9. Execute the same scenarios for groups A and B. The X  scenarios should have 
elements of Type I, II, and III anomalies. Group performance was manually recorded 
during each scenario, using video back up. Manual recording was accomplished via 
the emulator time-stamp, where each command is denoted on the computer screen 
according to time transmitted.
CREW
Standard-1 Standard-2 Expert-1 Expert-2
9 2 15 4
6 10 7 12
13 15 12 5
(O 11 8 3 9
oa 3 5 13 15a*a. 8 3 10 13o 10 7 11 1
4 14 14 6
3o- 15 12 2 3« 2 4 8 2
1 13 4 7
7 1 1 11
12 6 6 10
14 11 9 8
5 9 5 14
Fiaure 5.4: Randomized scenario order
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10. Collect Subjective Data following each scenario using the designed surveys that 
support the SWAT technique.
11. Analyze the time data and perform ‘a priori' type classification. Time data was 
analyzed using Cox’s Proportional Hazards model. Although type categorization was 
performed initially for the anomaly sampling and scenario construction, this will be 
performed again using the data obtained (time to resolve and perceived difficulty) to 
ensure proper categorization.
5.9.2 Anomaly sampling techniques. The sampling scheme used was obtained using 
the JMP software “shuffle" function to ensure randomization (Figure 5.4). The anomalies 
were initially sampled from the bank of all anomalies so that 15 of each type were 
selected, and then were combined to form the scenarios. There were over 100 
anomalies available for sampling. For each scenario, one of each type of anomaly was 
chosen at random so that all scenarios incorporated 3 anomalies.
5.9.3 Crew sampling techniques and associated effects.
5.9.3.1 Sampling and selection. A tabular representation can be viewed in Figure 5.5. 
Each standard crew is comprised of four members, and an operator is defined by a 
single crewmember (four operators per crew). These individuals will accomplish two 
things: 1) collectively interpret identical computer displays representing the same 
anomalies, and 2) simultaneously attempt to resolve them as a team. This team concept 
and variation of knowledge within those teams contribute to nesting of the crews within 
knowledge levels (this effect will be discussed in section 5.9.3.2).
The crew members were randomly selected from available volunteers. With 
random selection, the variation that is contributed by different crews can also be
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estimated (the random effect of “crew”). The random crew selection process was limited 
in two ways: 1) the crews must contain all four crew positions, and these individuals 
must be selected among those members qualified in that crew position, and 2) 
selections must be made from those members who choose to participate in the study 
(which did not include the total operational crew force).
One substantial issue was that the number of expert operators is alarmingly 
small, and the sample size in which to draw capable, experienced subjects was 
miniscule. Qualified subject limitations have promoted use of such methods by 
promising appropriately powerful statistical comparisons of many conditions using few 






























Figure 5.5: Experiment design
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promoted use of repeated measures as a means to maximize sensitivity within available 
time and funding resources (Bittner, 1992). Some of the most challenging 
repeated measures problems are Practice Effects (learning curve), Carry-Over and 
Sensitization Effects, and Situational Demand Characteristics (performance flexibility) 
(Weimer, 1995).
To familiarize the reader with the current experience level of the operations 
crews, the time on crew was recorded for each individual and position, and the mean 
was determined for all members who are currently certified in the squadron. Figure 5.6 
provides a brief description of an average crew member at a particular snapshot in time. 
It is important to note that this parameter changes with time, so the composite crew 
average varied in appearance as the time to conduct the test approached. The data 
yielded the values shown in the table (as of 9 May 99). The crews selected to 
participate in the study had the experience composition shown in Figure 5.7.
Position Mean time qualified on crew 
(days)
Ground System Operator 565
Satellite System Operator 424
Crew Commander/ Satellite System Operator 396
DSP Engineer 252
Figure 5.6: Crew qualification times (all operations crews, standard level)
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CREW Time qualified on crew (months)
Standard -1
Ground System Operator 10
Satellite System Operator 25
Crew Commander 21
DSP Engineer 34
Standard -  2
Ground System Operator 24





Expert -  2
Engineer/ Operator (quad-qualified) 159
Figure 5.7: Subject crew qualification times
5.9.3.2 Nesting. Effects restricted to a single level of a factor are said to be nested 
within that factor. Nesting is often used as a method to reduce residual variation by 
allocating variation. In this study, the factor of crew is nested within knowledge level and 
will be treated as a random effect. The use of nesting is valuable in this case: because 
the response measured is a crew response, nesting allows estimation of the variation 
attributable to use of the various crews. The design factor of crew is nested within 
knowledge level and random since both crews within each factor level are considered a 
random selection from all possible crews. Figure 5.8 demonstrates how nesting results 
in the experiment.
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Figure 5.8: Nesting/blocking scheme
5.9.3.3 Blocking. A block corresponds to trials of an experiment that occur under 
similar conditions. Simply stated, a block is a homogeneous grouping of experimental 
trials. Figure 5.8 shows applicable blocking schemes, and depicts running 15 scenarios 
total (based on resource limitations), having equal combinations of anomaly difficulties in 
the scenarios. To explain in more detail, Scenario 1 contains three anomalies that were 
presented to each of the four crews in random order. Since the anomalies were 
identical, the responses to Scenario 1 form a block. Therefore, 15 total blocks 
(scenarios) result. As noted in the table, each scenario will be run four times in random
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order, twice for experts and twice for standard crews, resulting in four replications of the 
experiment.
In this experiment, blocking on scenario allows estimation of scenario 
differences. This allows one to focus more sharply on knowledge level and type 
differences, and provides greater power to detect differences in the levels of these 
factors. Scenario variation is treated as nuisance variation; it is estimated and 
eliminated from further consideration.
5.10 Analysis Methods
The following section outlines the methods employed to analyze the raw time
data.
5.10.1 Variability Charts. This technique was used to examine the integrity of the data, 
determine points that were outliers, and estimate the data distribution. During this 
portion, natural log transformations of the data were also examined. The JMP software 
was used to accomplish all of these functions, and the actual analysis may be viewed in 
the next chapter.
5.10.2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Since the Proportional Hazards platform 
(discussed in the section 5.10.3) in JMP does not allow for examination of random 
effects, the ANOVA analysis was first used to see if random effects of crew could be 
eventually neglected. The ANOVA method was used to estimate the contribution of 
residual variation for the random effects of crew , and these estimates can be viewed in 
section 6.2.1.
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5.10.3 Cox's Proportional Hazards Model (for Continuous Data). Cox’s Proportional 
Hazard's model is used extensively in medical studies for survival data. The model 
provides the researcher with the ability to distinguish differences in hazard functions 
without specifying the form of the functions, producing an assessment of survival time 
unbiased by incomplete (censored) data. The Proportional Hazards model is a semi- 
parametric technique that allows for comparisons between hazard and survival functions 
for multiple groups. The baseline hazard function is the non-parametric portion of the 
model, while the linear portion is parametric.
As mentioned, the model uses censored (missing) data and enables examination 
of the impact of several different variables between groups. In the experiment, censored 
data results when measurements of the continuous response of “time to resolve" exceed 
the scenario length, or the crew has conceded defeat by that anomaly. If the anomaly is 
not resolved, the time spent trying to resolve the anomaly will be measured as a 
censored observation, resulting in right-censored data. The appeal of this analysis 
method is that it uses censored data in a manner such that it is unbiased. For the 
purposes of this experiment, the traditional term “failure rate" describes the “success of 
anomaly resolution rate”, and “time to event" is time to resolution or censoring (up to the 
60 minute maximum).
There are two descriptions of time to an event: survival probability and hazard 
rate, and these are directly related. Survival time is synonymous with either failure time, 
time to an event, or duration. Survival data is usually best modeled by non-normal 
distributions, such as the exponential, Weibull, and lognormal. The hazard function can 
be defined as the instantaneous failure (or duration) rate, and the survivorship function is 
the probability that an individual survives longer than time, t.
Two significant properties that should be checked when considering this analysis 
method are that the survival functions do not cross (since the hazard functions are
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assumed to be proportional), and that the difference between log-log transformations of 
the two survival functions associated with the two proportional hazard functions are 
constant (Selvin, 1995). When these assumptions are satisfied, one is able to apply 
Cox’s Proportional Hazards model appropriately.
Recall that the hazard function can be defined as the instantaneous failure (or 
duration) rate, and the survival function is the probability that an individual survives 
longer than time, t. The survival function and hazard functions (Lee, 1992), respectively, 
can be written as
S(t) = Probability {an individual survives longer than time, t} = P (T > t)
A(t) -  Urn Pfan individual ofaae t fails in the aoe interval (t. t + At)} .
jt-*o At
The relationship between the hazard function, /.(t) and survivorship function, S(t) 
at a specific time t is
A (t) =  - d S ( f) ld t 
S(t)
If the concepts of hazard rates and survival functions are applied to the specific 
case of proportional hazards models, the general proportional hazards models for the f  
hazard function and k covariates can be written as
k
Aj(t; x v, x2j, xkJ)  =  A0(t) c(xy, x 2j, xkj)  =  A0(t) e  .
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Seivin (1995) discusses the proportionality property of survival curves and hazard 
functions related by a constant, c. This proportionality follows from the equation above, 
and can be described as:
A i(t) -  C A2(t) (Hazard functions of two groups)
and
S 7 (t) -  [S 2(t) ] c (Survival functions of two groups)
where the constant of proportionality, c = A.i(t) I >.2(t). S,(t) and S2(t) represent survival 
times for two groups of interest, 1 and 2 , and A.,(t), /.2(t) are their associated baseline 
hazard functions. The proportionality of both the hazard functions (and consequently, 
the survival functions) follows from the initial assumption of proportional hazards 
introduced earlier.
Seivin (1991) states that the constant of proportionality, c, can also be factored 
into a series of relative hazard ratios for several (k) independent variables, or
A iftxa , X21, X31, . . xk1 ) /A 2(t;xi2, x22, x32, xk2) = c - c 1 c2 c3 ... ck ,
where Cy = e b' (Xl1 ~ x'2> .
Explained simply, if two hazard functions are proportional, the constant of proportionality 
factors into relative hazard ratios; and each constant, c ,, reflects the separate role of an 
independent variable. This enables the comparisons for two groups experiencing 
several different indicator variables, and comparing the composite effects of multiple 
covariates simultaneously.
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Covariates considered were knowledge level, anomaly type, scenario, crew 
(nested within knowledge level, random effect), and the interaction of type and 
knowledge (type * knowledge). The censoring indicator was either 0 (resolved) or 1 
(unresolved, or censored).
The proportional hazards model for this specific experiment can be described as:
Xj(t) =  Xo (t) BXp {biXknowledge +  ^2^<ypef7) *  ^3*fype(2)
b 4 (Xtype(1)X knowledge) ^5(^(ype(2) X knowledge) boX [crew(exp)[knowledge]
15
b7X[crew(std)[knowledge] *  ^  b  / XSCenario_i }
1=1
where >.,(t) represents the j  m hazard function (maybe say “represents the hazard 
function for the jth treatment") and XQ (t) is the baseline hazard function.
One null hypothesis of interest is the null hypothesis (H0) that there is no
difference between the two knowledge group anomaly resolution times, versus the
alternative hypothesis (H,) that a difference does exist. Mathematically, these can be 
written as:
Hoi C  — 1, o r  k  1 (t', Xknowledge (exp)) ~  k 2 (t ,’ Xknowledge(std))
Hal C & 1, Or k i  ( t ( t , ’ Xknowledge(exp)) &  k2(t‘, Xknowledge(std)) •
This hypothesis was tested for the two knowledge groups of expert and standard, where 
knowledge was used as the grouping variable.
A different null hypothesis is that there is no difference in anomaly difficulty, 
versus the alternative that a difference exists. This hypothesis is:
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H0: C — 1, or Aj (t;Xtype(1)) — feftiXtypefi)) s -^3(t t^ype(3))
Ha^ C * 1 ,  Or A j  (t;Xfype(1)) ^  -^2(fi t^ype(2)) ^  ^ -3(t'Xtype(3))-
The professional edition of JMP has Cox’s Proportional Hazards model as an 
analysis tool option, and this platform was used for data analysis. This model in JMP 
supports nesting, but not random effects.
5.11 Summary
The intent of this chapter is to outline the plan to answer the research questions 
posed in Section 5.4:
1. Can satellite anomalies be effectively categorized into 3 distinct types 
(defining knowledge level required for resolution success) so that they can be 
used to guide automation of future systems? The SWAT technique was used to 
address this question.
2. Is the difference in terms of anomaly resolution accuracy between two 
knowledge levels statistically significant? Resolution accuracy resulted in a 
measurable, uncensored resolution time for analysis. Indirectly, Cox’
Proportional Hazards models were used to address this question.
3. Is the difference in terms of anomaly resolution efficiency between two 
knowledge levels statistically significant? Cox' Proportional Hazards models 
were used to address this question.
4. Are there differences at the 95% confidence level among the six treatments 
(specific main effect combinations, anomaly type by knowledge level
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interactions)? Cox' Proportional Hazards models were used to address this 
question.
5. Are there differential effects of knowledge level across the anomaly types on 
error resolution time (accuracy and efficiency)? Cox’ Proportional Hazards 
models were used to address this question.
6. Does higher knowledge level result in:
• a more accurate system (fewer errors)?
• a more efficient system (less time required to resolve anomalies)?
• a lower cost system (fewer operators required)?
The belief is that these questions can be answered satisfactorily using the statistical 
techniques described in this chapter. The combinations of objective and subjective data 
should provide an accurate and comprehensive view of the operator environment and 
task perceptions, as well as the variation in performance between groups of varying 
experience and knowledge.
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Chapter 6
DATA PRESENTATION AND RESULTS
6.1 Introduction
The software packages used for data analysis were the JMP Professional and 
JMP student versions created by the SAS Institute. Subjective data was analyzed using 
the SWAT Version 3.1. released by Gary Reid of the Armstrong Aerospace Medical 
Research Laboratory.
6.2 Time Data
6.2.1 Initial Analysis. A first look of the raw resolution time data yielded descriptive 
statistics of a mean of 494 seconds (approximately 8 minutes) and a standard deviation 
of 620 seconds (approximately 10 minutes). A complete table of means and standard 
deviations for each crew (excluding the censored observations) may be viewed in Figure 
6.1. Note that the sigmas are relatively narrow and the means increase, as expected, 
with complexity. However, the Type 1 mean value for the Standard-2 Crew does not 
follow the other Type 1 mean trends -  the value of 393 seconds seems significantly 
larger than the other Type 1 means. This is due to two large resolution times for this 
crew (Type 1 anomaly resolution times of 1103 and 1303 seconds). If these two 
"outliers" are excluded, the mean Type 1 resolution time for the Standard-2 Crew, drops 
to 268 seconds.
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Crew
fll
Standard-1 Standard-2 Expert-1 Expert-2
1 1 H = 168.270 M = 392.667 ft -  177.071 M = 153.200
> a  =122.601 a =  114.713 o  = 127.018 (t =51.232s 2 M = 433.857 M = 366.929 H = 405.600 ft = 215.867i a  = 126.904 u  -  118.739 o  = 122.711 a  =51.232i 3 M -  707.154 f t -  811.929 ft = 765.467 H = 322.467
er= 131.694 <t  — 118.739 a  = 122.711 a  =51.232
Figure 6.1: Means and standard deviations for resolution times (six censored
observations excluded)
Upon initial inspection of the data, it was apparent that the resolution time data 
(in seconds) was not normally distributed. The natural log was taken of all resolution 
time measurements, and a Shapiro-Wilk test for normality was conducted (the test 
hypothesizes that the data is normally distributed). Test results showed that although 
the untransformed data was not normal (Shapiro-Wilk p-value ~ 0), the log-transformed 
data did not show evidence of non-normality ((Shapiro-Wilk p-value = 0.1767). Plots and 
normality tests are shown in Figure 6.2.
The raw resolution time measurements most closely followed a lognormal 
distribution (a distribution of a variable whose logarithm follows the normal distribution). 
The Weibull distribution was also a close candidate. However, the lognormal proved to 
provide a better fit. Therefore, there is strong evidence that the In(time) data is normal 
since both the lognormal fit the raw data well and the log transformed data passed the 
Shapiro-Wilk test. The lognormal fit and parameter estimates are shown in Figure 6.3; 
censored times are boxed in red.
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In(time)
Quantiles Quantiles
maximum 100 0% 3600 0 maximum 100 0% 8 1887
99 5% 3600 0 99 5% 8 1887
97.5% 2829 3 97 5% 7 9478
900% 1140 9 90.0% 7 0396
quartile 75.0% 564 5 quaitile 750% 6.3359
median 500% 261 5 median 50.0% 5 5664
quartile 250% 1150 quartile 250% 4 7449
100% 69.1 10 0% 42355
2.5% 4 06 2.5% 3 7025
05% 11 0 0 5% 2.3979




Std Error Mean 
Upper 95% Mean 













Std Error Mean 
Upper 95% Mean 










Test for Normality 





Test for Normality 





Figure 6.2: Distribution Analysis (time and In(time))
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Knowledge Mu Sigma L95 Mu U95 Mu L95 Sigma U95 Sigma N Failed
Exp 5.37537 1.01524 5.16335 5.58765 0.88207 1.18555 89
Std 5.83082 1.19138 5.58181 6.08188 1.02997 1.39950 85
Summary
Group N Failed N Censored Mean Std Dev
Exp 89 1 364.244 Biased 48.538
Std 85 5 594.611 Biased 73.6274
Combined 174 6 480.866 Biased 45.1665
Quantiles
Group Median Time Lower95% Upper95% 25% Failures 75% Failures
Exp 173 149 273 95 405
Std 323 251 396 158 640
Combined 262 206 323 115 568
Tests Between Groups
Test ChiSquare DF Prob>ChiSq
Log-Rank 7.6240 1 0.0058
Wilcoxon 7.6568 1 0.0057
Fiaure 6.3: Lognormal fit for both knowledge levels
Variability plots depict the variation of the time data across scenario, knowledge group, 
and anomaly type. Large colored blocks denote censored observations in the time 
graphs only. The first set of plots (time) on each variability chart represent the raw 
(untransformed) data. These plots are presented in Figures 6.4 -  6.7.
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Figure 6.7: Variability charts for type vs. time and tn(time). Symbols represent individual crew observations.
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The colored markers in the variability charts represent the individual observations of the 
crews for each anomaly resolution time. Note that in Figures 6.4 and 6.5, the scenario 
to scenario variation appears large compared to the within-scenario variation, validating 
the use of scenario as a blocking variable. Figure 6.6 shows definite variation in the 
expert crew knowledge levels, demonstrating that one expert (expert 2) is much more 
consistent in resolution ability than the other expert and both the standard crews. This 
expert crew variation was also evident in the data analysis and will be discussed in 
section 6.2.3.3. Examining the type variability (Figure 6.7), it is also apparent that 
resolution time increases with the difficulty level. There is notable variation between 
Types 1 and 2, while there is significantly less variation between Types 2 and 3.
Initially, an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed using design factors of 
knowledge (expert/standard), type (1, 2, or 3), and crew with nested under knowledge. 
A model for In(time) was developed that included these three factors, the interaction of 
type and knowledge, and scenario as a blocking variable. The purpose was to examine 
the overall effects of the factors and assess the contribution of the random effect of 
crew. This was of concern since the Proportional Hazards Model platform in JMP 
Professional does not permit for inclusion of random effects. As seen in Figure 6.8, it 
was determined that this random effect did have a small contribution (0.080) to the 
residual variation of the overall variance component (0.956), accounting for roughly 10% 
of the total variation. However, as mentioned earlier, JMP does not permit analysis of 
random effects in the Proportional Hazards analysis. Even though the random 
component of the variation could not be estimated in the final proportional hazards 
model, the nested effect of crew within knowledge was included since there was a 
definite contribution of the nesting effect of crew within knowledge. The implication of 
this decision is that results relating to crew differences within knowledge groups from the
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These estimates based on equating Mean Squares to Expected Value.
Figure 6.8: Random effects of crew nested within knowledge
6.2 2 Cox's Proportional Hazards Analysis. Final time data analysis was accomplished 
using Cox’s Proportional Hazards model, where “time to event" in this study is resolution 
time (rather than “survival time"). The time data during this analysis was not transformed, 
since the Proportional Hazards analysis models the raw data itself. This is useful, as it is 
much more meaningful to interpret the data in pure time versus In(time). As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the model itself is partially non-parametric and partially parametric. The non- 
parametric portion is the baseline hazard, and this function can virtually be of any form. 
The parametric part is the linear component; namely, the linear model for the covariates. 
Because of these model characteristics, the nature of the underlying distribution is 
independent of the proportional hazards model fit.
The fact that the survival curves for knowledge and type do not cross (Figures 
6.9 and 6.10) is a major indicator that the CPH model is appropriate, namely, this 
suggests that the hazard functions may be proportional (Seivin, 1995). The Log-Rank 
and Wilcoxon tests for the log-normal transformed data in JMP tests the hypothesis that 
the survival functions are the same across the knowledge and type groups. The high 
significance of these two tests (Pknoweidge = 0.0058 and 0.0057, respectively; Ptype < 
0.0001 for both) indicates the null hypothesis that the groups are the same should be
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rejected. The proportionality and parallel nature of knowledge group survival curves can 
be verified pictorially, as seen in Figures 6.9 and 6.10.
To verify that Cox’s Proportional Hazards model is suitable for the analysis, it is 
possible to construct various plots of the expert and standard crews for comparison. 
Namely, if the Proportional Hazards model is fit for both groups and compared to the 
Kaplan-Meier Survival curves for the same crews, we can verify that the Cox’s 
Proportional hazards model is a good fit and is an appropriate selection. Additionally, 
log-log transformations of the Proportional Hazards model fit can be compared for each 
group, expert and standard (Seivin, 1991). This should show, in all cases, that the 
functions are approximately additive.
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Group N Failed N Censored Mean Std Dev
Exp 89 1 364.244 Biased 48.538
Std 85 5 594.611 Biased 73.6274
Combined 174 6 480.866 Biased 45.1665
Quantiles
Group Median Time Lower95% Upper95% 25% Failures 75% Failures
Exp 173 149 273 95 405
Std 323 251 396 158 640
Combined 262 206 323 115 568
Tests Between Groups
Test ChiSquare DF Prob>ChiSq
Log-Rank 7.6240 1 0.0058
Wilcoxon 7.6568 1 0.0057
Figure 6.9: Survival plot of time data grouped by knowledge level
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Figure 6.10: Survival plot of time data grouped by anomaly type
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Kaplan-Meier and Cox's Proportional Hazards Survival Functions Versus Resolution Time,
Standard Crews
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Kaplan-Meier and Cox's Proportional Hazards Survival Functions Versus Resolution Time,
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Log-Log Transformation of Kapian-Meier and Cox's Proportional Hazards Survival Functions
Versus Resolution Time, Combined Crews

















Log-Log Transformation of Kaplan-Meier and Cox's Proportional Hazards Survival Functions

















Log-Log Transformation of Kaplan-Meier and Cox's Proportional Hazards Survival Functions










6.2.2.1 Full model. The initial iteration of the Cox’s Proportional Hazards model in JMP 
contained design factors of knowledge, scenario, crew (nested within knowledge) type 
and knowledge * type, with time as the response variable. Six of the 180 observations 
were censored, meaning that the anomaly was not resolved within the scenario length. 
Censored observations occurred in scenarios 1, 3, 6 and 12. This censoring effect was 
denoted in the survival analysis model as “censored”.
In this first analysis, it was immediately obvious that while scenario appeared 
significant (p = 0.0003), it used 14 degrees out of 21 total degrees of freedom that could 
instead be used to estimate error. There was a definite trade-off between blocking by 
scenario and leaving the effect in the model and freeing up the related degrees of 
freedom by excluding it. Scenario could be arguably removed since when modeling for 
real-life events, "scenarios” are not fixed and anomaly arrangements occur randomly. 
Also, the model excluding scenario provides greater ease of interpretation. Subsequent 
trial models were executed leaving the scenario factor either intact or excluded.
In the full-model analysis, the only non-significant effect was the interaction of 
type and knowledge; all other p-values were significant in terms of the test alpha value of 
0.05.
Therefore, a final model was fit excluding scenario and the interaction term 
(Figure 6.17). This model appeared to adequately describe the data in the absence of 
the scenario factor and the non-significant type*know(edge interaction term, and was 
consequently selected as the final version. The survival plots for both the full and final 
models were characteristic of typical survival data. Details on interpreting parameter 
estimates, confidence intervals, and risk ratios will be provided later in the chapter.
6.2.2.2 Final model. The final model (Figure 6.17) has a total of 180 observations (174
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Proportional Hazards Fit
Censored By: Censor 
Whole Model
Number of Events 174
Number of Censorings 6
Total Number 180
Model -LogLikelihood ChiSquare DF Prob>Chisq




Term Estimate Std Error Lower CL Upper CL
Type[1] 0.51857556 0.111787 0.2960881 0.7351246
Type[2] -0.0164525 0.1085937 -0.23332 0.1932407
Knowledge[E] 0.24186848 0.0771774 0.0906036 0.3936179
Knowledge[S]:Crew[Expert-1] -0.3541922 0.1098282 -0.570589 -0.138694
Knowledge[S j:Crew(Standard-1 ] 0.11409119 0.1102571 -0.10293 0.3308068
Risk Ratios
Term Risk Ratio Lower CL Upper CL
Type[1] 1.679633 1.344589 2.085742
Type[2] 0.983682 0.7919 1.213175
Knowledge[E] 1.273627 1.094835 1.482334
Knowledge[E]:Crew[Expert-11 0.70174 0.565192 0.870494
Knowledge[S]:Crew(standard-1 ] 1.120854 0.90219 1.392091
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Type 2 2 27.0365012 0.0000
Knowledge 1 1 9.78103458 0.0018
Crew(Knowledge) 2 2 11 3506271 0.0034










0.0   " * * * ♦  *  .._ + *  +
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Time
Figure 6.17: Cox’s Proportional Hazards Model; baseline survival plot (final model)
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complete/6 censored) and five degrees of freedom (DF). One DF results from the two 
knowledge levels (expert/standard), two DF from anomaly type levels (1, 2, and 3), and 
two from the crew effect (two expert and two standard crews nested within knowledge). 
The final proportional hazards model can be mathematically expressed as:
Aj(t) =  X0 (t) exp {biXfj +  b2x 2j +  b3x 3j +  b^x4i +  bsx5j}  
or specifically,
Xj(t) = Xq (t) exp {b  iXknowledge ^2 t^ype(1) ^  ^3^type(2)
b 4X [crew(exp)[knowledge] + bsX[Crew(std)[knowledge)}
where A/0 represents the j  m hazard function and A0 (t) is the baseline hazard function.
The parameter estimates and indicator variables can be described as:
• Knowledge: parameter estimate = b1t indicator variable x1(, where
.0, otherwise
1 if high
• Type: parameter estimates = b2l (type 1), b3 (type 2)
indicator variables x2, (type 1), x3j (type 2), where
.0, otherwise
1 if type = 1
.0, otherwise
1 if type = 2
Type 3 denoted when x2j = x3j = 0
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• Crew, Nested Within Knowledge: parameter estimates -
b4 (expert crew 1 (knowledge expert)), 
b5 (standard crew 1 (knowledge expert))
One method of interpreting the JMP data is analysis of the Effect Likelihood Ratio 
Tests, which indicate whether an effect is statistically significant or not. This test 
compares the two models using the likelihood function, and fits them based on maximum 
likelihood. One model assumes that the response is constrained, while the other model 
is not constrained. This means that the model is based on either including or not 
including a factor in modeling the response. Therefore, a response containing no factors 
(H0) is compared to a response including a factor, such as knowledge (Ha) to determine 
if significant differences exist across the constrained groups. Twice the difference of the 
log-likelihoods is a chi-square statistic that is used for testing the null hypothesis. This 
chi-square statistic can be interpreted similarly to any test statistic according to p-value 
significance of at a pre-specified alpha level.
In survival analysis, a meaningful interpretation of the contributions of main 
effects is provided by the risk ratios (RR). Risk ratios (also called hazard ratios) are the 
relative rates of hazard between groups. Risk ratios can also be interpreted as an 
estimate of the risk of failure at a given time (Selvin, 1995). However, in this case study, 
the risk of failure is translated into the opportunity for anomaly resolution. When two 
hazard functions are identical, the hazard ratio is c = 1, or c = I Xo =1. Hazard ratios 
in the region of c = 1, or hazard ratio confidence intervals (Cl's) containing the value of 
one result in an inability to reject the null hypothesis H0 (no difference exists among 
groups) in favor of the alternative, Ha. (a difference exists).
It is important to note that choice of data interpretation by either Effect Likelihood 
Ratios or Risk Ratios results in no loss of data or explanation, since they vary only by an 
exponential transformation. It is solely a description technique preference.
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6.2.3 Proportional Hazards Results.
6.2.3.1 Type. The main effect of anomaly type shows a highly significant Effect 
Likelihood Ratio Test of p *  0, indicating that the null hypothesis of anomaly resolution 
times being identical across different anomaly types should be rejected. Type 3 
anomalies were compared against types 1 and 2. When examining the risk ratios for the 
main effect of type, all confidence intervals contain the value of one (cannot reject H0) 
with exception of Type[1]. This provides evidence of a significant difference across 
hazard functions, indicating Type 1 anomalies were resolved faster than Types 2 and 3.
More specifically, operators resolved Type 1 anomalies 1.680 times faster on 
average than Type 3 anomalies. Type 2 anomalies were resolved in roughly the same 
amount of time as Type 3’s (RR = 0.984 = 1, RRCI [0.792, 1.213]), indicating that the 
difficulty level between the two types is similar among all operators, or that the initial 
differentiation between anomaly difficulties of types 2 and 3 was inaccurate. In this 
instance, subjective data collected during the experiment will prove to be extremely 
useful, as anomaly difficulty should not be represented solely by resolution time.
6.2.3.2 Knowledge. The most important main effect tested was knowledge. Knowledge 
main effects were significant at a p-value of 0.0016. This verifies there was a significant 
difference in resolution ability between knowledge groups, and the hazard functions 
were not identical (RR = 1.274, RRCI [1.095,1.482]). This would lead to the rejection of 
the null hypothesis that there is no difference in expert or standard groups' time to 
resolve.
Experts were 1.274 times faster overall (RRCI [1.095, 1.482]) in resolving 
anomalies than the standard group. Experts were also 2.140 times faster in resolving 
Type 1 anomalies than Type 3’s (Cexp*Ctype 1 = e0 242 e0519 = (1.680)(1.274) = 2.14),
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whereas standard crews were 1.680 times faster in resolving Type 1’s than Type 3's 
(Csw#Ctype 1 = e° e0519 = (1)(1.680) = 1.680). However, for type 2 anomaly resolution, 
again there was not a noted difference between that of resolving type 2’s and 3’s.
To make this interpretation more meaningful, suppose all crews had 100 
anomalies to resolve in a certain amount of time. If the experts resolved all 100 
anomalies, the standard crews would solve only about 78 of those anomalies in that 
same time, regardless of anomaly type. If there were multiple type 1 anomalies for the 
crews to address, the experts would be able to correctly resolve 215 anomalies in the 
same time the standard crews would be able to complete 168 anomalies. Subsequently, 
experts would correct 126 type 2’s and 128 type 3’s in the same amount of time that the 
standard crews would require to resolve 98 and 100 type 2's and 3's, respectively. The 
Risk Ratio calculations are shown in Figure 6.18; all ratios are calculated relative to Type 
3 and their interactions with Type 3.
6.2.3.3 Crew effects. The analysis verifies that there is no significant difference in the 
standard crews nested within the knowledge levels, indicating that the two specific crews 
chosen within the standard knowledge level do not appear to differ. The reader should 
be reminded that crew, in this analysis, is being treated as a fixed effect rather than a 
random effect. However, there is a significant difference between the expert crews. 
This indicates non-homogeneity of ability between the experts, which is actually not 
surprising; expert 1 has 37 months on crew, whereas expert 2 has 159 months of 
experience. The small population of expert operators made it impossible to guarantee 
homogeneity of experience levels. Therefore, although there is a disparity between 
experience levels, the data is still meaningful and interpretabfe.
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Parameter Parameter Estimate Calculations Risk R atio
Type 1 0.519 e 0519 1.680
Type 2 -0.016 g -6.016 0.984
Type 3 0 e 0 1.000
Knowledge (expert) 0.242 e 0 24i 1.274
Knowledge (standard) 0 e 0 1.000
Knowledge (exp) * Type (1) e 0 Z4Ze 0 S19 2.140
Knowledge (std) * Type (1) e °e0 519 1.680
Knowledge (exp) * Type (2) g 0.242g -0 016 1.254
Knowledge (std) * Type (2) e °e -0016 0.984
Knowledge (exp) * Type (3) e 0 Z42e 0 1.274
Figure 6.18: Risk Ratio Calculations
6.3 Subjective Data
6.3.1 SWAT Analysis. Subjective data collected following each of the 15 scenarios for 
all four test groups was analyzed using the Subjective Workload Assessment Technique 
(SWAT) software package , version 3.1. This software required an older PC with a DOS 
version of 6.0 or earlier. In addition, the ANSI.SYS file must be added to the 
CONFIG.SYS prior to booting into DOS mode to ensure proper program operation.
6.3.2 SWAT Data Interpretation.
6.3.2.1 Rescaling. The participants performed the card sort of 27 cards in order to 
arrive at a scale describing perceived difficulty of certain tasks. These cards generically 
described the complexity of arbitrary tasks, and the subjects were requested to rank 
order these cards. Once this was completed, the card order was entered in the SWAT 
software for each member, after which the rescaled data was computed for all 8 
participants. The solution translates the Time Effort (T), Mental Effort (E), and 
Psychological Stress (S) ratings into single, numerical values. For example, if a subject
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ranks an event with a T-E-S difficulty of 3-3-3, the equivalent rescaled value is 100. This 





1 1 1 1 -1.1632 .0
2 1 1 2 -.6194 23.1
3 1 1 3 -.0795 46.0
4 12 1 -.7880 15.9
5 12 2 -.2442 39.0
6 12 3 .2957 61.9
7 13 1 -.3948 32.6
8 13 2 .1490 55.7
9 13 3 .6889 78.6
10 2 11 -.9486 9.1
11 2 12 -.4047 32.2
12 2 13 .1351 55.1
13 2 2 1 -.5733 25.0
14 2 2 2 -.0295 48.1
15 2 2 3 .5104 71.0
IS 2 3 1 -.1802 41.7
17 2 3 2 .3636 64.8
18 2 3 3 .9035 87.7
19 3 11 -.6594 21.4
20 3 12 -.1155 44.5
21 3 13 .4243 67.4
22 3 2 1 -.2841 37.3
23 3 2 2 .2597 60.4
24 3 2 3 .7996 83.3
25 3 3 1 .1090 54.0
26 3 3 2 .6528 77.1
27 3 3 3 1.1927 100.0
B a a g a s s a  ■   . .
Figure 6.19: SWAT Rescaling
The experimenter has the option of applying a group solution (all group members 
have the same rating scale), a prototype solution (the experimenter can create subject 
subgroup solutions), or individual solutions. This decision is based on the value of the 
Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance. The coefficient describes how well the subjects 
are in agreement with each other in terms of perceived difficulty. If there is considerable 
agreement among the participants, the coefficient should be greater than 0.75. It is then
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up to the experimenter as to which option best describes the data and satisfies the 
experiment goals. The coefficient is determined during the prototype correlations 
analysis, where a Spearman’s rank order correlation is performed on each of the 
subject's rank ordered data. The rankings are associated with the possible prototype 
groups, and the correlations are indicative of the relative importance each subject 
assigns to the three dimensions of Time, Effort and Stress.
The Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance for the study data was 0.883, 
indicating a high correlation between how the subjects defined "difficulty” (Figure 6.20). 
Also note that the suggested prototype for the majority of subjects was S, meaning that 
six out of eight participants thought that Psychological Stress was the most appropriate 
descriptor of effort. Two of the eight subjects (subjects 2 and 6) thought that Mental 
Effort was the most significant dimension; however, the overall correlation among the 
group was high enough so that they also matched the Stress prototype. This enabled 
use of a group solution since, statistically, it appeared that all subjects were in general 
agreement about the ordering of the cards and the relative importance of the three 
dimensions.
A plot was also generated in the SWAT analysis (Figure 6.21) to indicate the 
goodness of fit of the rescaled values. The appropriate plot is linearly decreasing from 
left to right, and data points not laying on the line indicate cards that were displaced from 
the pattern. The entire SWAT analysis can be seen in Appendix A, Raw Data.
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Figure 6.20: Prototype Analysis and Subject Correlation
PROTOTYPE ANALYSIS OP BACH SUBJECTS DATA **•
THH KENDALL'S COBPPXBXBNT OP CONCORDANCE MAS: M - .8831
SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION (RS) POR BACH SUBJECT
SUGGESTED
aub. # TBS TSB BTS BST SET STB PROTOTYPE
l .54 .61 .63 .73 .93 .90 S
2 .69 .65 .86 .88 .77 .72 B
3 .65 .69 .63 .66 .78 .79 S
4 .60 .68 .58 .65 .90 .90 S
S .66 .77 .51 .56 .88 .93 S
6 .65 .62 .84 .87 .79 .72 B
7 .41 .52 .50 .64 .98 .95 S
8 .42 .46 .59 .70 .83 .77 S
Figure 6.21: Goodness of Fit of Rescaled Values
PLOT OP OAIOXXAL DATA (X-AXIS) VS. DISPARITI6S (Y-AXIS)
1.31 1.31
1.26 • 1.26






.92 0 • .92
.99 . .96
.83 • .93
.78 0 * .76
.73 .73
.68 0 • .66
.64 0 • .64
.59 . .59
.54 • .54
.49 0 • .49
.44 0 .44
.40 • .40
.35 0 • .35
.30 . 0 .30
.25 0 • .25
.21 • .21
.16 0 0 .16
. 11 0 • .11
.06 • .06
.01 . . . .01
- .03 0 • - .03
- .09 0 • • .08
• .13 0 - .13
-.18 0 • - .18
- .23 0 • -.23
- .27 . 0 -.27
- .32 • -.32
- .37 • - .37
- .42 0 0 - .42
- .46 • - .46
- .51 • - .51• .56 . 0 - .56
>.61 0 • - .61- .66 0 • - .66- .70 - .70• .75 • - .75- .80 0 • -.60




- 1.13 . -1.13
- 1 . 1* 0 • • 1.16
- 1.23 • -1.23
-1.29 t• • • •s• • • • , • • • • , • • • • _ • • • • . , • • • * , •
1 - 2410000.  - 19. 6000. - 15. 2000.  - 10. 6000.  - 6 . 4000.  - 2 . 0000.
-1.28
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6.3.2.2 Event Scoring. The event scoring phase occurred immediately following each 
scenario. The scoring data for each participant was collected and collated so that the 
data could be analyzed later. The goals of data analysis were to:
1) Examine how the SWAT data agrees with the pre-assigned anomaly difficulty 
levels
2) Examine how the SWAT data agrees with the time data
3) Determine if there is natural delineation in the SWAT data so that task difficulty 
can be separated into three different levels (1. 2 and 3).
To have the data representation consistent with the analysis up to this point, it was 
decided that the rescaled SWAT values would be combined for the individual standard 
operators into a crew solution. This way, the four crews could be compared as in the 
time data analysis. Therefore, the event scoring was averaged into a single response 
for each anomaly event, resulting in four responses: expert-1, expert-2, standard-1 and 
standard-2.
First the data was plotted to see if there were any noticeable breaks in the data. 
The overlay plot in Figure 6.22 shows a slight delineation between the anomaly type 
difficulties, where the plot of 180 observations appears to show breaks at the 25 and 50 
difficulty levels of the SWAT scale. One method of possible categorization is to refer to 
anomalies with a SWAT ranking of < 25.0 as Type 1, <50 as Type 2, and >50 as Type 3.
The purpose of this categorization is to generate a ranking method to guide 
automation of particular tasks. The intent is that automation might be easily performed 
on many of the Type 1 anomalies, and perhaps some of the Type 2 anomalies. Type 3 
anomalies are generally not well suited for automating.
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Figure 6.22: Overlay Plot of SWAT Anomaly Difficulty by resolution times
Response: SWAT
(Summary o< Ft )
RSquare 0.15086
R Square Adj 0.141266
Root Mean Square Error 27.62735
Mean of Response 37.25867
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 180
[ Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|tl
Intercept 37.256667 2.059221 18.09 <0001
Type [1-3] -15.66667 2.912178 -5.38 <.0001
Typep-3] 3.8416687 2.912178 1.32 0.1888
(Effect Test )
Source Nparm OF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob>F
Type 2 2 24002.008 15.7231 <0001
Figure 6.23: One-way analysis of variance, SWAT rating by type
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The analysis in Figure 6.23 compares the SWAT ratings by type. The high 
significance of type (p = 0.0001) shows that the initial type ratings are consistent with the 
perceived difficulty ratings assigned to each anomaly by the crews. The non-significant 
p-value for Type 2 and 3 comparisons reinforces the findings found in the Cox's 
Proportional Hazards analysis: the anomalies may have been either initially mistyped or 





Root Mean Square Error 25.69657
Mean of Response 37.25667
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 180
(Lack of Tit )
Source 
Lack of Fit 
Pure Error 
Total Error











Itta  RSq 
0.2127
(Parameter Estimates ]
Term Estimate Std Error t  Ratio Prob>lt Lower 951 Upper 951
Intercept 37.256667 1.989846 18.72 <.0001 33.329597 41.183736
Type [1-3] -15.66667 2.814066 -5.57 <0001 •21.22038 -10.11295
Typep-3] 3.8416667 2.814066 1.37 0.1739 -1.712040 9.3953821
Knouiledg[E*pert-Standar] 7.3286667 1.989846 3.68 0.0003 3.3995969 11.253736
(Effect Test )
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob>F
Type 2 2 24002.008 16.8386 <.0001
Knowledge 1 1 9662.408 13.5573 0.0003
Figure 6.24: ANOVA with SWAT rating by type and knowledge
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The model in Figure 6.24 includes both type and knowledge in the analysis. The 
analysis of variance with two factors confirms the significance of type (p = 0.0001) and 
knowledge (p = 0.0003) in comparison with the SWAT ratings data.
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SWAT
Time
Figure 6.25: Resolution time by SWAT ratings
The plot in Figure 6.25 compares the resolution time with the perceived difficulty 
ratings. Note that for the most part, both values increase linearly. However, there are a 
few anomalies where the resolution time is large in comparison with the perceived 
difficulty level. This would indicate that the event, although requiring significant time to 
resolve, was not considered by the crew to be difficult. This also supports the fact that
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all subjects ranked Time Stress as the least significant of the three dimensions 
pertaining to perceived difficulty.
If the crews are further separated into standard and expert, this linearly 
increasing relationship is also confirmed by examining a scatterplot of time by SWAT 
rating, grouped by standard or expert (Figures 6.26 and 6.27). The lines fit for the 
groups show an overall increase of both time and SWAT rating. The ANOVA performed 
for each plot shows that the standard crew data for resolution time by SWAT rating was 
highly significant (psundard 1 = Pstandard2 = 0.0001), showing evidence of high correlation 
between time data and SWAT ratings assigned to the anomalies. Expert's data only 
slightly agreed between resolution time and subjective difficulty ratings, showing only 
marginal significance (pexPem = 0.0692, pexpert 2 = 0.0868).
If the roles of SWAT rating and resolution time are switched, the results are 
virtually identical (Figures 6.28 and 6.29). Letting SWAT rating be the response, and 
resolution time be the predictor (since it is measured precisely), the standard crew p- 
values were identical to the analysis in 6.24 (pStandard 1 = Psiandard2 = 0.0001). Expert’s 
results were also the same (Pexpem = 0.0692, pexpert 2 = 0.0868).
An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed with SWAT rating as the 
response, and resolution time as a continuous predictor, containing factors of 
knowledge, type and knowledge'type. The initial analysis showed that the interaction 
term was not significant (p = 0.929), and was eliminated from subsequent runs. The 
final ANCOVA may be seen in Figure 6.30. All factors included were highly significant 
(Ptime = 0.0008, Pknowiedge = Ptype <0.0001). In sum, this alpha-level significance 
demonstrates that anomaly typing cannot be based on resolution time alone.
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i —  Linear Fit Crew=Std-l
I  Linear Fit Crew=Std-2I_______________________
Linear Fit Crew=Std-1 




Root Mean Square Error 630 3878
Mean of Response 607 8
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 45
Analysis of Variance
Source OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 15358713 15358713 386491
Error 43 17087717 397388 8 Prob>F
C Total 44 32446429 <0001
Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Sid Error t Ratio Prob>|1| Lower 95% Upper 95%
intercept -81 6351 145.359 -0.56 0 5773 -374 7783 211 50811
SWAT 26352314 4.238861 6.22 < 0001 17 803869 34 900759
Linear Fit Crew=Std-2
Time *  103 816 » 15.0833 SWAT
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 
RSquare Ad)
Root Mean Square Error 
Mean of Response 



































Figure 6.26: Scatterplot of resolution time by SWAT ratings for standard crews
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—  linear Fit Crew=Expert-)
—  Linear Fit Crew=£*pert*2
Linear Fit Crew* Exp art-1
Time * 266 778 * 7.73884 SWAT
Summary of Pit
RSquare 0 07473
RSquare Adj 0 053212
Root Mean Square Error 680 0511
Mean of Response 525 4444
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 45
Analysis of Vanance
Source OF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 1606127 1606127 3.4729
Error 43 19886188 462469 PfOb>F
C Total 44 21492315 0.0692
Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob»|t|
Intercept 266.77808 171.88 1 55 0 1280
SWAT 7738838 4.152669 1 86 0.0692
■ -  ' --- -
Linear Fit Crew*E*pert»2 




Root Mean Square Error 201 6442
Mean of Response 230 5111
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 45
Analysis of Vanance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 124872.0 124872 3.0711
Error 43 1748397.3 40660 Prob>F
C Total 44 1873269.2 0.0868
Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>[t|
Intercept 151.90256 53.99676 2.81 0.0074
SWAT 1.4102156 0.804709 1.75 0.0868
Figure 6.27: Scatterplot of resolution time by SWAT ratings for expert crews
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—  Linear Fit Crew=Std-1
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Root Mean Square Error 
Mean of Response 






Term Esnmale Sid Error t Ratio
Intercept 15.244555 3.017192 5.05
Time 00179626 0 002889 6.22
Linear Fit Crew>Sld-2 
SWAT * 20.6709 ♦ 0.02128 Time 
Summary of Fit
RSquare 0 321013
RSquare Adj 0 305223
Root Mean Square Error 19.95926
Mean of Response 33.69778
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 45
Analysis of Vanance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 8098.755 8098.75 20.3296
Error 43 17129995 398 37 Prob>F
C Total 44 25228 750 < 0001
Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob»|t| Lower 95% Upper 95%
intercept 20.67088 4.147305 4.98 < 0001 12.307075 29.034686
Time 0.0212827 0.00472 4.51 <0001 0.0117635 0.0308019
Figure 6.28: Scatterplot of SWAT ratings by resolution time for standard crews
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Prob»|t| Lewer 95% Upper 95% 
<0001 9.1598308 21 32928
<0001 0 0121357 0.0237895
Analysis of Vanance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
Model 1 10469 000 10469 0
Error 43 11647 546 270 9
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—  Unaar Fit Crews Expart-2
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Root Mean Square Error
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Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Proo>|t| Lower 95% Upper 95%
intercept 28 350476 4 498539 6 30 < 0001 19 278342 37 42261
Time 00096565 0 005162 1 86 0 0692 -0 000793 0 0201064
Unear Fit Crews Expert-2 
SWAT * 44 8461 ♦ 0 04727 Time
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 
RSquare Ad)
Root Mean Square Error 
Mean of Response 







OF Sum of Squares Mean Square
1 4185 608 418561















44 846123 8 303349
0 0472693 0 026973
t Ratio Prob>(t| 








Figure 6.29: Scatterpiot of SWAT ratings by resolution time for expert crews
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Response SWAT
(summary of Fit ]
RSquare 0.260924
RSquare Adj 0.244031
Root Mean Square Bror 25.9216
M an  of Response 37.25667
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 180
(lack of Tit )
Source 


















M x  RSq 
0.9979
(parameter Estimates ]
Teim Estimate Std Bror t Ratio Prob>lt Lower 95 X Upper 95X
Intercept 31.964288 2.476046 12.91 <.0001 27.077478 36.851095
Time 0.0107142 0.003135 3.42 0.0008 0.0046271 0.0169012
Type[1-3] •13.37265 2.813611 •4.75 <0001 -18.92568 •7.819608
Type [2-3] 4.4307076 2.737807 1.62 0.1074 •0.97272 9 8341355
Knowledg [Erpert-Standar] 8.5693311 1.965996 4.38 <0001 4.6891748 12.449487
(Effect Test )
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob>F
Time 1 1 7848.764 11.6809 0.0008
Type 2 2 15503.009 11.5362 <0001
Knowledge 1 1 12765.922 18.9989 <0001
Figure 6.30: ANCOVA of SWAT ratings by resolution time, knowledge and type
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Correlation between perceived difficulty and resolution time for each of the four 
crews were also examined (Figure 6.31). Correlation is a measure of the strength of 
association between two variables. There is a higher correlation between the SWAT 
data and the time data for the standard crews, while the experts show much weaker 
correlation, suggesting that there is greater connection between perceived difficulty and 




SWAT Time SWAT Time
SWAT 1.0000 0.2734 SWAT 1.0000 0.6880
Time 0.2734 1.0000 Time 0.6880 1.0000
Covariance Matrix Covariance Matrix
SWAT Time SWAT Time
SWAT 609.50280 4716.8434 SWAT 502.64877 13245.958




SWAT Time SWAT Time
SWAT 1.0000 0.2582 SWAT 1.0000 0.5666
Time 0.2582 1.0000 Time 0.5666 1.0000
Covariance Matrix Covariance Matrix
SWAT Time SWAT Time
SWAT 1427.0566 2012.4575 SWAT 573.38068 8648.4661
Time 2012.4575 42574.301 Time 8648.4661 406361.54
Figure 6.31: Correlation and covariance matrices of SWAT ratings by resolution time for
expert and standard crews
6.4 Summary
The time data presents convincing evidence that there is a considerable 
difference in resolution times between the expert and standard knowledge levels. 
Knowledge main effects were significant at a p-value of 0.0016. This verifies there was
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a significant difference in resolution ability between knowledge groups, and the hazard 
functions were not identical (RR = 1.274, RRCI [1.095,1.482]). This would lead to the 
rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no difference in expert or standard groups’ 
time to resolve.
The main effect of anomaly type shows a highly significant Effect Likelihood 
Ratio Test of p « 0, indicating that the null hypothesis of anomaly resolution times being 
identical across different anomaly types should be rejected.
The appropriate SWAT scaling solution was a group solution, proving the 
operators were in general agreement with how they defined perceived difficulty and how 
they ranked the three dimensions of the time effort (T), mental effort (E), and 
psychological stress (S) ratings.
Analyses confirm that whether the SWAT data is modeled the predictor or the 
response, type is a significant effect when modeled with resolution time. The high 
correlation indicates that resolution time alone cannot be the sole consideration when 
performing anomaly typing for automation
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Operators resolved Type 1 anomalies 1.680 times faster on average than Type 3 
anomalies. Type 2 anomalies were resolved in roughly the same amount of time as 
Type 3’s (RR = 0.984 = 1, RRCI [0.792, 1.213]), indicating that the difficulty level 
between the two types is similar among all operators, or that the initial differentiation 
between anomaly difficulties of Types 2 and 3 was inaccurate. In this instance, 
subjective data collected during the experiment will prove to be extremely useful, as 
anomaly difficulty should not be represented solely by resolution time.
The time data presents convincing evidence that there is a considerable 
difference in resolution times between the expert and standard knowledge levels. 
Knowledge main effects were significant at a p-value of 0.0016. This verifies there was 
a significant difference in resolution ability between knowledge groups, and the hazard 
functions were not identical (RR = 1.274, RRCI [1.095,1.482]). This would lead to the 
rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no difference in expert or standard groups’ 
time to resolve.
Experts were 1.274 times faster overall (RRCI [1.095, 1.482]) in resolving 
anomalies than the standard group. Experts were also 2.140 times faster in resolving 
Type 1 anomalies than Type 3’s, whereas standard crews were 1.680 times faster in 
resolving Type 1's than Type 3’s. However, for Type 2 anomaly resolution, again there
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was not a noted difference between that of resolving Type 2’s and 3’s.
The data showed that there was a significant difference in ability to resolve 
anomalies between expert and standard groups. Although there was some variation in 
the ability levels of the expert crews, overall they outperformed their standard 
counterparts (p value of 0.0016). In a single time period, experts could resolve 1.28 
more anomalies than standard crews.
The main effect of anomaly type shows a highly significant Effect Likelihood 
Ratio Test of p « 0, indicating that the null hypothesis of anomaly resolution times being 
identical across different anomaly types should be rejected. More specifically, there was 
a significant difference in overall operator ability in resolving Type 1 anomalies over 
Types 2 or 3: Type 1 anomalies were resolved 1.69 times faster than Type 3 anomalies. 
There was no evidence of significant difference between Type 2 and 3 resolution times, 
as they were resolved in roughly the same amount of time. This could be attributed to 
not appropriately differentiating between the types during initial classification.
There was definite variation in the expert crew knowledge levels, demonstrating 
that one expert (expert 2) is much more consistent in resolution ability than the other 
expert and both the standard crews.
7.7.2 Subjective Data.
The appropriate SWAT scaling solution was a group solution, proving the 
operators were in general agreement with how they defined perceived difficulty and how 
they ranked the three dimensions of the Time Effort (T), Mental Effort (E), and 
Psychological Stress (S) ratings. The Subjective Workload Analysis Technique (SWAT) 
analysis demonstrated that the crews felt that Psychological Stress (S) was the most 
important dimension in determining subjective workload. The Kendall's Coefficient of 
Concordance for the study data was 0.883 (83.3%), indicating a high correlation
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between how the subjects defined ‘difficulty”. Six out of eight participants thought that 
Psychological Stress was the most appropriate descriptor of effort. Two of the eight 
subjects (subjects 2 and 6) thought that Mental Effort was the most significant 
dimension; however, the overall correlation among the group was high enough so that 
they also matched the Psychological Stress prototype. This leads to the conclusion that 
it would be inappropriate to use resolution time as the sole measure of operator ability, 
since Time Stress (T) was rated as the lowest dimension.
There appeared a natural delineation in the raw data at the SWAT Ratings of 25 
and 50, leading to possible categorization levels for type segregation. Natural breaks in 
the data can help guide automation, enabling automation of Type 1 anomalies and 
possibly some Type 2 tasks. Discretion must be used when selecting candidates for 
automation by choosing tasks that are more easily automated, have highly deterministic 
indicators, and are unaffected by software/hardware limitations.
Analyses confirmed that whether the SWAT data is modeled as the predictor or 
the response, type is a significant effect when modeled with resolution time. The high 
correlation indicates that resolution time alone cannot be the sole consideration when 
performing anomaly typing for automation.
Standard crew data for resolution time by SWAT rating was highly significant 
(Pstandard 1 = Pstandard 2 = 0.0001), showing evidence of high correlation between time data 
and SWAT ratings assigned to the anomalies. Expert's data only slightly agreed 
between resolution time and subjective difficulty ratings, showing only marginal 
significance (Peipen 1 = 0.0692, Pexpert 2 = 0.0868). There was also evidence of high 
significance between pre-specified anomaly type and SWAT difficulty rating (p = 0.0001).
The bottom line is that automation typing may not be accurately performed on 
resolution time alone. Consideration of subjective data (perceived difficulty) should be 
given when separating tasks into different difficulty levels.
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7.1.3 Additional Analysis and Considerations
The anomalies were initially grouped by difficulty Types 1, 2 and 3. This was 
based on operator experience and exposure, historical probability of occurrence, 
likelihood, intensity of resolution process and estimated level of training required for 
resolution. Although these were "educated” categorizations, the data showed minimal 
discrimination of resolution ability between Type 2 and 3 anomalies. Therefore, it 
seemed advantageous to analyze the data separated into two difficulty levels: Type 1 
and Type 2/3.
The analysis results demonstrated that although it initially seemed beneficial to 
classify the data into two types, this resulted in an unbalanced design. In the 
"combined" design, there was a total of 60 Type 1 observations and 120 combined Type 
2/3's. The results still gave highly significant p-values, but the unbalanced design 
slightly skewed the risk ratio values. Therefore, a more ideal solution would be either to
1) re-accompiish the experiment with only two anomaly types and ensure a balanced 
design with equal anomalies, or 2) randomly sample the Type 2/3 observations to 
include only 60 of the observations in the design. Regardless, a meaningful combined 
data analysis could only be facilitated through experiment redesign.
One notable point to consider is the six censored observations. These 
observations resulted from the crew being unable, either due to confusion or lack of 
training and experience, to resolve the anomaly. An important question to contemplate 
is the following: are these data points significant enough to propel the results to another 
level? Specifically, if the operator is trained at a certain level, could one conclude that at 
that particular level of experience and training that they would never be able to resolve 
that anomaly? It is possible or reasonable to suggest that since they were never 
exposed to the "answer”, they might never arrive confidently at that correct answer.
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More importantly, can that conclusion be drawn based on the data presented here 
alone? Regardless of the ability or inability to prove this hypothesis, this leads to a 
puzzling and intriguing problem worthy of further investigation.
7.2 Recommendations
The intent of this research was to provide data to aid in investigating the role of 
human knowledge in the combined human-machine unit. The results lead to the 
possibilities of:
1) decreasing the number of human operators
2) increasing human knowledge level (experience and training)
3) applying this derived information and knowledge in developing a new, 
improved machine-system capability through future research.
The following are outcomes or recommendations based on the study results:
7.2.1 Operators. One expert operator can surpass a crew of four standard operators’ 
anomaly resolution capability in terms of accuracy and efficiency. Although the 
reduction in crew size is an end result, the principal finding is to enhance the level of 
training and experience of the operator crew force. This can be accomplished while 
simultaneously reducing the number of personnel needed. This is in agreement with the 
current military philosophy: a tendency towards reduction in crew sizes while guarding 
against redundancy compromises.
7.2.2 Continuity. Maximize "knowledge" by keeping personnel in the job longer. It 
appears that the current time on station (approximately three years) is not adequate to 
achieve the level of training and experience needed for operators to be able to 
effectively resolve anomalies above the Type 1 difficulty level. Adequate continuity is
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the only way to achieve increased operator experience, an indispensable part of the 
expert operator composition. A higher degree of continuity could be achieved by several 
means:
1) Extending time on station requirements for military operator personnel
2) Transition satellite operations to a Air Force Reserve crew force who can 
remain in place indefinitely
3) Migrate towards a DoD civilian or contractor crew with military oversight
7.2.3 Training. Train personnel for longer periods of time (apprenticeship programs). 
Create operator redundancy by training multiple operators so that there is overlap for 
satellite crises, employee vacations and employee turnover. Instruct operators to an 
“engineering" level of knowledge; in greater depth than the current standard. Opposing 
this recommendation is the current military trend towards skill level reduction, or 
transition of positions to the lowest pay grade to reduce costs. However, the study data 
would indicate that this technique reduces the anomaly resolution ability resident within 
the crew force.
7.2.4 Task difficulty and awareness. When assessing task difficulty, resolution time is 
an effective measurand. However, gauging perceived difficulty is necessary to 
determine true difficulty level and evaluate what tasks are well suited for automation. 
Active promotion of task surveys could determine what operator actions are candidates 
for automation. This would aid in defining tasks that could be removed from manual 
resolution so that operator attention could be directed to more non-deterministic 
problems. It could also help in training issues, where constant definition and revision of
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typical and atypical performance tasks are necessary in designing complete and 
effective training programs.
7.2.5 Personnel Cost Estimates. One standard crew currently costs more to maintain 
than a crew of one expert operator. Cost is a major factor when determining what 
person should perform the job. The current philosophy is to train brand new recruits to 
perform satellite operations. The rationale behind this method is to reduce labor costs, 
as enlisted operators are much less costly than paying officers to perform the job. 
However, as seen in the table below, one standard crew can cost significantly more to 
maintain than a crew of one expert operator.
GSO E1-E3 $19,647.60
SSO-1 E1-E3 $19,647.60
SSO-2 E3-E5 $22,595.40 $102,369.40
ENG 02-03 $40,474.80
EXPERT N/A $70,000.00 $70,000
* Military pay figures derived from AF Pay Table dated July 1, 2001. High and low 
estimates of base pay and housing allowance were averaged for each pay scale range. 
Figure 7.1: Estimated crew costs
Experts, being in a training phase for considerably longer than their standard 
counterparts, would require some type of apprenticeship (formal school and on-the-job 
training) phase. Therefore, it seemed prudent to base estimates of one “expert” crew as 
a crew with one fully qualified expert plus an expert apprentice-in-training. This training
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phase could last 3 years. Conversely, the standard crews might require apprenticeships 
of only a few months. What this implies is the following: standard crews are “ready” to 
perform the job at the standard level a much earlier time, while experts (in order to 
achieve the “expert” knowledge level), would not be able to operate autonomously for a 
much longer period. However, it is important to consider that even if the standard crews 
are deemed crew qualified faster, this does not negate the additional cost of on-site 
contractor support. The on-site contractor team is currently comprised of approximately 
8 individuals. The argument is that if expert operators are trained at the desired level of 
proficiency, the necessity for contractor support on-site would be greatly diminished, and 
possibly unnecessary.
If an ample crew force is developed, situations of operator turnover, crew 
leave/vacation, and sick time must be considered. It was estimated that six crews could 
adequately fill all shifts while still leaving sufficient personnel to allow for excess 
coverage. The following estimates are based on 24/7 operations, 8 hour shifts.
Standard 6 Crews (24 Operators) $614,216.40
Expert 6 Crews (12 Operators) $420,000.00
Figure 7.2: Estimated crew force and associated costs
In short, it is obvious that even though a single expert operator costs more than a 
standard operator, the overall crew costs should be considerably less. To make this 
option even more appealing, an expert crew has significantly more ability and knowledge 
than the standard crews, and should provide higher return for the investment.
112
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7.2.6 Screen Re-desian. In consideration of the findings presented in Chapter 6, this 
section offers some considerations for the next step in the system design process. 
Research conclusions stated thus far focus only on varying operator knowledge levels 
and crew force. However, a follow-on study should be conducted in the future to 
examine the benefit gained through display redesign and technology improvement. This 
portion investigates potential solutions for technical and machine issues associated with 
system design. The Center for Research Support (CERES) plans to examine the 
machine component of the system formally following their assessment of the data 
presented in this study.
7.2.6.1 Background. The current screens by which data is viewed are cumbersome, 
hard to read, and over saturates the operators with unnecessary data. According to 
Elvers, et al. (1993), “the role of the human in many complex systems is as a system 
monitor. Rather than providing a single overall indication of their status, these systems 
tend to present the operator with numerous separate pieces of information, none of 
which reflects overall status." Furthermore, Jones et al. (1995) verifies that a 
hierarchical structure applied to data display (in this particular example, it was applied to 
satellite telemetry data) can be useful in managing complexity.
After detailing the purpose of satellite telemetry displays and standard crew 
tasks, a preliminary exploration of potential display schemes will be presented in this 
section. An important note is that screen redesign will not affect other users extensively 
in the network. Satellite telemetry screens are used exclusively by the 1 SOPS 
operators and their backup node, and screen displays are generated by interpreting the 
existing telemetry streams emanating from the vehicle. Altering the interpretation of 
these streams does not affect the Automated Remote Tracking Station, satellite vehicle 
or end-users of the data.
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7.2.6.2 Satellite State-of-Health. The state-of-health screens are not user friendly and 
saturate the operator with unnecessary data. An example of the satellite bus telemetry 
frame may be viewed in Figure 7.3. Over 650 data points are displayed to the operator 
through several screens -  many are repeated values. It is not to say that the data on 
the screens is not useful. However, for the typical 'Type I anomalies" that are easily 
fixed, it is not always necessary to examine the data to the level of detail presented 
regularly to the operator. As previously noted, the satellite State of Health (SOH) 
process involves a series of approximately seven computer displays that present the 
data in either color-coded mnemonics (representing various subsystem entities, such as 
battery temperatures, etc.), telemetry patterns, or pure numerical values. Certain ranges 
are specified, and if the point is determined by the system to be "out of limits" because it 
is out of range, the mnemonic appears yellow (warning) or red (critical). Another data 
check is a manual check of numerical data, consisting of an entire page requiring an 
actual value check. This methodology greatly multiplies the risk of human error. The 
claim is that these functions are well suited for computers, but not for humans. 
Additionally, the number of screens can be drastically reduced by at least half. In our 
redesigned system, the only data necessary for display are out-of-limit points; points 
within limits are considered nominal and should be eliminated from the initial display. 
This will greatly minimize the time and personnel required for routine, nominal SOH's.
7.2.6.3 SOH Screens. The redesign involves a combination of audio/video notifications 
involving anomalies. It is a hierarchical display, originating from simplistic to complex. 
The operator has a view of the entire satellite constellation (a change from the current 
method of control, where the crew examined the SOH on only one satellite at a time) 
and gets immediate feedback of an anomaly off the main screen. Each satellite
114
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
monitored will show green in the absence of anomaly. Upon a change in status, the box 
will change color (either yellow or red, indicating severity of the problem) and will be 
accompanied by an audible alarm. The operator can 'mouse click' on the affected 
vehicle, bringing up a series of menus arranged according to subsystem. The affected 
subsystem(s) will also have the color displayed on the initial box, so as to guide the 
operator through the correct path. Simultaneously, if the problem is a Type 1 or 2 
anomaly, the suggested plan of action (in terms of anomaly commanding) will present 
itself in a separate box, allowing the operator to execute the plan if necessary. Figures
7.4 through 7.8 display the new screen designs for the SOH process.
Currently, military operators are required to have "full health". Primarily, crew 
members have full corrected visual acuity, and must be <20/20 (corrected). Vision is 
tested annually, and space operators cannot be colorblind. If this requirement was to be 
waived so colorblind individuals were not excluded, there are some possible 
substitutions for color processing and alarms. Some possible replacement schemes are 
indicating anomalous conditions or alarms via blinking subsystem components, 
expanding three-dimensional alarm blocks, varied font, and similar techniques.
7.2.6.4 Satellite Commanding. In the area of satellite commanding, command plan 
checklists exist for several possible anomalies or system reconfigurations. The current 
command plans involve the human manually typing in each command to the satellite. 
Figure 7.8 shows one possible command window scheme. It becomes immediately 
obvious that there is currently great potential for error -  the incorrect command sent at 
an inopportune time can have disastrous effects on the vehicle.
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In addition, not all necessary command sequences exist in checklist format, and the 
operators (at the current knowledge level) are unable to act promptly if any of the less- 
probable conditions exist. Therefore, it is advantageous to have all known command 
sequences loaded and/or automated so that timeliness is maximized and errors are 
minimized. It is important to bear in mind that automation is no substitute for knowledge 
level, and this is most apparent when uncertainty enters the scenario. Uncertainty 
makes determining the correct command plan for execution a challenge -  a 
responsibility that at this time cannot be relinquished to a machine. This is where human 
beings offer the most value to the system. As past experience and expert knowledge 
levels become players, the machine's role becomes the tool for human intervention. The 
decision-making prowess of the individual is a critical component in the human-machine 
unit, and so it is imperative to embrace human problem solving dexterity in conjunction 
with the commanding process.
7.2.6.5 Summary. As previously mentioned, these are merely suggestions for re­
design that could be incorporated into a follow-on study to this project. This future study 
would focus on optimization of the “machine” portion of the human-machine system. 
Variation of machine technology could provide useful data on desired system 
characteristics assuming the operator knowledge level was held constant. After 
determining the desired operator knowledge level, the overall system could then be 
more effectively designed for the optimal operator.
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Figure 7.5: Subsystem Level
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Figure 7.6: Subsystem Level - Detail
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Figure 7.8: Commanding Window
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Estimations of expert operator improvement for recognizing and identifying anomalies 









1 161.6 30 81.4%
2 310.7 240 22.75%
3 544.0 400 26.5%
Figure 7.9: Estimated Expert Operator Improvement
Specific to the outcome of this study, it is expected that screen redesign would have a 
significant effect on the expert operator. It would allow them to be free of vegetative, 
caretaker-tasks and allow them to use their expertise where it is desperately needed: 
experts would be able to perform more non-deterministic, decision making tasks. More 
significantly, they could focus efforts on auxiliary tasks of mission planning, orbit analysis 
and other responsibilities, possibly eliminating the need for additional personnel to perform 
those necessary functions. It is important to note that any redesign should be accompanied 
by extensive testing for functionality and operator usability.
7.2.7 Follow-on studies. Follow-on studies are necessary. Satellite command and control 
optimization consists of not only the optimal operator, but also an optimal machine-system. 
This research represents only one of three possible examinations of this perplexing issue:
1) Focus on operator knowledge by varying user experience and training and
maintaining machine technology as a constant (this study)
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2) Focus on machine capability by varying technology and maintaining operator 
knowledge as a constant (future study)
3) Optimize the entire human-machine system further by employing a human 
centered design strategy during the optimization process (future study).
7.3 Significance and Implications
The Defense Support Program satellites cost roughly $375 million per vehicle. The 
exceptional cost and criticality associated with this system (and other similar complex 
systems) argue the necessity of precise and timely system control. As it stands, anomaly 
resolution is a time-consuming and cumbersome process. The claim is that by placing the 
decision-making and knowledge base into the system through the human, in combination 
with an interface that facilitates troubleshooting, adds automation, and informatively 
presents data by filtering out unnecessary distracters, we can significantly improve 
timeliness and accuracy of SOH's and planned/emergency commanding. This goal can be 
accomplished in conjunction with freeing up precious Remote Tracking Station resources 
and other Air Force Space Command assets by decreasing the amount of antenna time 
required for operations (current baseline is 10 minutes for nominal ranging and SOH 
missions). This study represents "Part 1" of an optimization study; "Part 2" should focus 
solely on the machine side. "Part 3" could continue the optimization of both user and 
machine to create a human-machine system capable of adapting to the rapidly changing 
space environment and able to contribute more fully to space control objectives.
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Appendix A
RAW DATA AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
This appendix includes raw data and a more detailed explanation of the methods used to 
analyze the scenario results.
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Scenario Description Assumed Type Time/Standard 1 Time/Standard 2 Time/Expert 1 Time/Expert 2
1 Impact sensor/OOL battery points 1 202 693 447 279
1 Solar array damage 2 589 148 449 859
1 Command bats, power conservation 3 2 8 0 7 " 955 453 335
2 Low plenum pressure 1 295 1103 119 93
2 Main tank propellant leak 2 11 192 220 138
2 Find alternate propellant path 3 2666 2166 1655 806
3 EM I 1 66 323 3600” 70
3 Broken transmitter/switch to 2B 2 958 968 694 234
3 Broken receiver/switch to RX3B 3 318 1633 1007 69
4 Star Sensor Closed 1 82 158 82 326
4 Command power off/no tunctional 2 397 416 157 33
4 Switch to SSPA-B 3 154 85 73 60
S Unexpected command counts 1 217 518 273 238
S Vehicle In eclipse 2 55 274 109 66
S Command batteries and monitor voltage 3 182 265 436 354
6 Incorrect TC S mode/OOL helium points 1 89 1303 85 149
6 Test/confirm helium leak 2 3510” 2 2 9 6 " 115 169
6 Swap to alternate TCS 3 515 35 173 167
7 Pump plenum on B side 1 202 99 173 330
7 Plenum leak 2 251 357 609 129
7 Swap Control Electronics Assy-A to B 3 1493 1615 1924 647













Scenario Description Assumed Type Time/Std 1 Time/Std 2 Time/Expert 1 Time/Exf
8 No 128K TLM or carrier present 1 58 78 145 39
8 Failover to redundant transmitter 2 1138 348 676 347
8 Failover to redundant KG-46 2B 3 389 604 568 212
9 Plenum low/Unexpected TV 1 619 410 332 262
9 A Decoder fails; swap to B 2 218 69 188 98
9 Swap to C decoder 3 251 1141 357 334
10 No 128K TLM (carrier present) 1 227 206 125 88
10 Failover to redundant KG-46 2 1140 310 1005 405
10 Failover to redundant TPU 3 1486 640 175 392
11 Star sensor stuck open 1 91 224 170 147
11 Power off commanding inoperative 2 87 183 87 42
11 Failover to redundant star sensor 3 270 261 77 100
12 Event detector 1 115 348 303 95
12 Impact sensor/plenum pump broken 2 241 396 67 47
12 Switch to redundant GGC coil and pump tank 3 3243“ 2854" 2364 278
13 No 1024K data (carrier present) 1 50 140 75 42
13 Failover to redundant DHU 2 396 618 545 300
13 Failover to redundant KG 46-1A 3 339 800 696 163
14 No 1024K data or carrier 1 85 90 60 80
14 Failover to redundant Linkl Transmitter 2 516 353 1023 208
14 Failover to redundant SSPA (high pwr amp) 3 576 805 1355 813
15 Battery points OOL/improper configuration 1 126 197 90 60
15 Command Bat 2 to TCMOM 2 77 505 138 163
15 Disconnect Bat 2 and recondition 3 554 362 169 107













Figure A.2: SWAT Ratings
Legend:
difficulty = Overall perceived anomaly difficulty [scale 1-10,10 being most difficult] 
NOTE: Scale is 1, 2, or 3 for T, E, and S SWAT ratings 
T = Perceived time load 
E = Perceived mental effort load 
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SCENARIO ANOMALY LOAD STD CREW 1 STD CREW 2
EXPERT 1 EXPERT 2
ENG SVO-1 SVO-2 ENG SVO-1 SVO-2 OP 6 p
:: i ::: it® ::: : :: : difficulty: : :: : ::  2: : : ; : ; ; :::: - 2 : : : : :
i i i i i i f e i - i i i i icwfictiity: ::: •: :3:::::: : : : : : :2::
:ftif|icuity: W &
15 i T 1 1 i 1 1 1 i 2
15 1 E 1 1 i 2 1 1 1 2
15 1 S 2 1 i 2 1 1 1 2
15 2 T 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 2
15 2 E 1 2 1 2 1 1 3
15 2 S 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 2
15 3 T 1 1 1 2 1 1 i 2
15 3 E 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2
15 3 S 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2
Figure A.2: SWAT Ratings (Continued)
145
Figure A.3: Complete SWAT Analysis
8 SUBJECTS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
i n N 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.
112 B 5.00 3.00 9.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 7.00 6.
113 *r 16.00 7.00 7.00 12.00 11.00 5.00 16.00 17.
121 p 4.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 4.00 7.
122 j 8.00 9.00 12.00 14.00 7.00 12.00 13.00 4.
123 c 20.00 15.00 18.00 18.00 15.00 15.00 22.00 20.
131 X 7.00 10.00 5.00 6.00 3.00 8.00 5.00 19.
132 s 15.00 17.00 16.00 15.00 14.00 17.00 14.00 13.
133 M 21.00 23.00 20.00 20.00 19.00 21.00 25.00 26.
211 U 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 2.
212 6 9.00 6.00 14.00 7.00 12.00 7.00 11.00 8.
213 Z 18.00 12.00 11.00 17.00 20.00 13.00 17.00 18.
221 V 6.00 8.00 6.00 5.00 8.00 9.00 8.00 3.
222 Q 12.00 14.00 13.00 16.00 16.00 14.00 15.00 9.
223 zz 23.00 20.00 19.00 19.00 23.00 22.00 23.00 22.
231 K 10.00 16.00 10.00 8.00 9.00 16.00 6.00 14.
232 B 22.00 22.00 17.00 21.00 17.00 23.00 19.00 16.
233 R 26.00 26.00 21.00 25.00 25.00 26.00 26.00 25.
311 H 3.00 5.00 3.00 9.00 6.00 3.00 3.00 5.
312 P 13.00 11.00 15.00 13.00 18.00 10.00 12.00 10.
313 D 19.00 18.00 26.00 24.00 24.00 18.00 21.00 23.
321 Y 11.00 13.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 11.00 9.00 11.
322 A 17.00 19.00 25.00 22.00 21.00 20.00 18.00 15.
323 0 24.00 24.00 22.00 26.00 26.00 24.00 24.00 24.
331 L 14.00 21.00 24.00 11.00 13.00 19.00 10.00 21.
332 T 25.00 25.00 23.00 23.00 22.00 25.00 20.00 12.
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*** PROTOTYPE ANALYSIS OP BACH SUBJECTS DATA ***
THE KENDALL'S COBFFIBIBNT OF CONCORDANCE NAS: N -
SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION (RS) FOR BACH SUBJECT
SUGGBSTBD
sub. # TBS TSB BTS BST SBT STB PROD
l .54 .61 .63 .73 .93 .90 S
2 .69 .65 .86 .88 .77 .72 B
3 .65 .69 .63 .66 .78 .79 S
4 .60 .68 .58 .65 .90 .90 S
5 .66 .77 .51 .56 .88 .93 s
6 .65 .62 .84 .87 .79 .72 B
7 .41 .52 .50 .64 .98 .95 s
8 .42 .46 .59 .70 .83 .77 s
.8831
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PLOT OP ORIGINAL DATA (X-AXIS) VS. DISPARITIES (Y-AXIS)
# #### # + • + • ### #### ##•# #### #• + # #### #### #### #» * » • • • • • • • • • •
1.31 1-31
1.26 * * 1-26
1.21 * 0 * 1-21
1•16 .. 1.16 
1.12 * * 1.12
1.07 * * 1.07
1.02 . 1.02
.97 * * .97
.92 * 0 • .92
.88 .. .88
.83 * * -83
.78 * 0 * .78
.73 .73
.68  *  0 *  .68
.64 * 0 * .64
.59 .. .59
.54 * * .54
.49 * 0 * .49
.44 0 .44
.40 * * .40
.35. * 0 * .35
.30 .. 0 .. .30
.25 * 0 * .25
.21 * * .21
.16 . 0 0 .16 
.11 * 0 * .11 
.06 * * -06
.01 .. .01
-.03 * 0 * -.03
-.08 * 0 * -.08 
-.13 0 -.13
-.18 * 0 * -.18 
-.23 * 0 * -.23
-.27 .. 0 -.27
-.32 * * -.32
-.37 * * -.37
-.42 0 0 .  -.42
-.46 * * -.46
-.51 * * -.51
-.56 .. 0 -.56
-.61 * 0 * -.61 
- . 6 6  *  0 *  - . 6 6  
-.70 . -.70
-.75 * * -.75
-.80 * 0 * -.80 
-.85 .. -.85
-.90 * * -.90
-.94 * 0 * -.94
-.99 . -.99
-1.04 * * -1.04
-1.09 * * -1.09
-1.13 .. .. -1.13
-1.18 * 0 * -1.18 
-1.23 * * -1.23
-1.28 . -128
. -24.0000. -19.6000. -15.2000. -10.8000. -6.4000. -2.0000.
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COMPLETE GROUP AXIOM HISTORY







• 2 7.00 3.00 11.00
- 3 19.00 14.00 21.00
S - 2
T ■ 1 2
• 1 6.00 8.00 10.00
- 2 4.00 9.00 15.00
- 3 13.00 16.00 12.00
S - 3
T - 1 2
- 1 17.00 18.00 23.00
- 2 20.00 22.00 24.00
- 3 26.00 25.00 27.00
Test Summary Statistics: Independence.
T independent of B AND S
The values printed below indicate the degree to which the axioms are 
being fit by the data. The SIGNI? columns indicate the observed *-value 
in testing the null hypothesis that the observed and expected error 
proportions are equal, when no z-value is given, (i.e., only *'s), it 
indicates an insufficient number of observations to do the hypothesis test.
NUMBER PROPORTN PROPORTN SIGNIP
OBSERVED EXPECTED
MAXIMUM TBSTS POSSIBLE: 108.0
TOTAL TBSTS: 108.0
SUCCESSES: 108.0 1.000 .500
FAILURES: .0 .000 .500 -10.39
STRONG ERRORS (ST): .0 .000
DOMINANT ST ERRORS: .0 .000 .750***
TRADEOFF ST BRRORS: .0 .000 .250***
NEAR BRRORS (MR): .0 .000
DOMINANT NR BRRORS: .0 .000
TRADEOFF NR BRRORS: .0 .000
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Independence: Factor S is the outside factor.
1 2  3
B Of T 1.000 .444 1.000
T Of B .778 .333 .778
Test Sunmary Statistics: Independence.
B independent of T AND S
The values printed below indicate the degree to which the axioms are 
being fit by the data. The SIGNIP columns indicate the observed z-value 
in testing the null hypothesis that the observed and expected error 
proportions are equal. When no z-value is given, (i.e., only *'a), it 
indicates an insufficient number of observations to do the hypothesis test
NUMBBR PROPORTN PROPORTN SIGNIP
OBSBRVBD BXPBCTBD
MAXIMUM TBSTS POSSIBLE: 108.0
TOTAL TBSTS: 108.0
SUCCBSSBS: 108.0 1.000 .500
FAILURES: .0 .000 .500 -10.39
STRONG BRRORS (ST): .0 .000
DOMINANT ST BRRORS: .0 .000 .750***
TRADEOFF ST BRRORS: .0 .000 .250***
WKAK BRRORS (MR): .0 .000
DOMINANT WK BRRORS: .0 .000
TRADEOFF NX BRRORS: .0 .000
Independence: Factor T is the outside factor.
1 2  3
S Of B .778 1.000 .778
B Of S .778 1.000 .778
Test Sunmary Statistics: Independence.
S independent of T AND B
The values printed below indicate the degree to which the axioms are 
being fit by the data. The SIGNXF columns indicate the observed z-value 
in testing the null hypothesis that the observed and expected error 
proportions are equal. When no z-value is given, (i.e., only *'■), it 
indicates an insufficient number of observations to do the hypothesis test.
NUMBBR PROPORTN PROPORTN SIGNIP
OBSBRVRD BXPBCTBD
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MAXIMUM TBSTS POSSIBLE: 108.0
TOTAL TBSTS: 108.0
SUCCESSES: 108.0 1.000 .500
PAILURBS: .0 .000 .500 -10.39
STRONG BRRORS (ST): .0 .000
DOMINANT ST BRRORS: .0 .000 .750***
TRADBOPP ST BRRORS: .0 .000 .250***
WBAK BRRORS (NX): .0 .000
DOMINANT NX BRRORS: .0 .000
TRADBOPP NX BRRORS: .0 .000
Independence: Pactor B is the outside factor.
l 2 3
T Of S 1.000 .778 .111
S Of T 1.000 .778 .778
Test Sunmary Statistics: Double Cancellation.
Double Cancellation in T X B
The values printed below indicate the degree to which the axioms are 
being fit by the data. The SIGNIP columns indicate the observed z-value 
in testing the null hypothesis that the observed and expected error 
proportions are equal. When no z-value is given, (i.e., only *'a), it 
indicates an insufficient number of observations to do the hypothesis test.
NUMBBR PROPORTN PROPORTN SIGNIP
OBSERVED BXPBCTBD
MAXIMUM TBSTS POSSIBLB: 3.0
TOTAL TBSTS: 3.0
SUCCBSS8S: 3.0 1.000 .250
PAILURBS: .0 .000 .750*
STRONG BRRORS (ST): .0 .000
WBAK BRRORS (NX): .0 .000
Test Summary Statistics: Double Cancellation.
Double Cancellation in B X S
NUMBBR PROPORTN PROPORTN SIGNIP
OBSBRVBD BXPBCTBD
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MAXIMUM TBSTS POSSIBLE: 3.0
TOTAL TBSTS: 3.0
SUCCBSSBS: 3.0 1.000 .250
PAILURBS: .0 .000 .750*
STRONG BRRORS (ST): .0 .000
WBAK BRRORS (WK): .0 .000
Test Sunmary Statistics: Double Cancellation.
Double Cancellation in S X T
NUMBBR PROPORTN PROPORTN
OBSBRVBD BXPBCTBD
MAXIMUM TBSTS POSSIBLB: 3.0
TOTAL TBSTS: 3.0
SUCCBSSBS: 3.0 1.000 .250
PAILURBS: .0 .000 .750*
STRONG BRRORS (ST): .0 .000
WBAK BRRORS (WK): .0 .000
Test Sunmary Statistics: Joint Independence.
The data matrix is being checked Cor Joint Independence:
T x B Independent of S .
Block: 1. Test Violations: Pirst 10 Failures.
1. T ■ 2 x B ■ 2 & T - 3 x B • l are not Indep of S - 1 &  S » 3
2. T - 2 x B > 2 &  T » 3 x B ■ 1 are not Indep of S • 2 i S « 3
Test Sunmary Statistics: Joint Independence.
T X B independent of S
The values printed below indicate the degree to which the axioms are 
being fit by the data. The SIGNIP columns indicate the observed z-value 
in testing the null hypothesis that the observed and expected error 
proportions are equal. When no z-value is given, (i.e., only *'s), it 
indicates an insufficient number of observations to do the hypothesis test.
NUMBBR PROPORTN PROPORTN SIGNIP
OBSBRVBD BXPBCTBD
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MAXIMUM TBSTS POSSIBLB: 108.0
TOTAL TBSTS: 108.0
SUCCBSSBS: 104.0 .963 .500
PAILURBS: 4.0 .037 .500 -9.62
STRONG BRRORS (ST): 2.0 .500
DOMINANT ST BRRORS .0 .000 .250 -1.15
TRADBOPP ST BRRORS 2.0 .500 .250 1.15
WK DOM 1 ST BRRORS .0 .000 .250 -1.15
WK DOM 2 ST BRRORS .0 .000 .250 -1.15
WBAK BRRORS (WK): 2.0 .500
DOMINANT WK BRRORS .0 .000
TRADEOFF WK BRRORS 2.0 .500
WK DOM 1 WK BRRORS .0 .000
WK DOM 2 WK BRRORS .0 .000
Joint-Independence: Factor S is the outside factor.
T , E Of S W - .874
S Of T , B W . .778
Test Sunmary Statistics: Joint independence.
E X  S independent of T
The values printed below indicate the degree to which the axioms are 
being fit by the data. The SIGNIP columns indicate the observed z-value 
in testing the null hypothesis that the observed and expected error 
proportions are equal. Mien no z-value is given, (i.e., only *'■), it 
indicates an insufficient number of observations to do the hypothesis test.
NUMBBR PROPORTN PROPORTN SIGNIP
OBSBRVBD BXPBCTBD
MAXIMUM TBSTS POSSIBLB: 108.0
TOTAL TBSTS: 108.0
SUCCBSSBS: 108.0 1.000 .500
PAILURBS: .0 .000 .500 -10.39
STRONG BRRORS (ST): .0 .000
DOMINANT ST BRRORS .0 .000 .250***
TRADBOPP ST BRRORS .0 .000 .250***
WK DOM 1 ST BRRORS .0 .000 .250***
WK DOM 2 ST BRRORS .0 .000 .250***
WBAK BRRORS (WK): .0 .000
DOMINANT WK BRRORS .0 .000
TRADBOPP WK BRRORS .0 .000
WK DOM 1 WK BRRORS .0 .000
WK DOM 2 WK BRRORS .0 .000
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Joint-Independence: Factor T is the outside factor.
B , S of T W « .933
T of B , S W . .481
Test Sumnary Statistics: Joint Independence.
The data matrix is being checked for Joint Independence:
S x T independent of B .
Block: 1. Test Violations: First 10 Failures.
1. S ■ 1 x T ■ 3 & S - 2 x T « 1 are not Indep of B - 1 &  B * 2
2. S - 1 x T > 3 &  S ■ 2 x T ■ 1 are not Indep of B « l &  E ■ 3
Test Summary Statistics: Joint Independence.
S X T independent of B
The values printed below indicate the degree to which the axioms are 
being fit by the data. The SISNIF columns indicate the observed z-value 
in testing the null hypothesis that the observed and expected error 
proportions are equal. When no z-value is given, (i.e., only *’s), it 
indicates an insufficient number of observations to do the hypothesis test.
NUMBBR PROPORTN PROPORTN SIGNIP
OBSBRVBD BXPBCTBD
MAXIMUM TBSTS POSSIBLB: 108.0
TOTAL TBSTS: 108.0
SUCCBSSBS: 104.0 .963 .500
PAILURBS: 4.0 .037 .500 -9.62
STRONG BRRORS (ST): 2.0 .500
DOMINANT ST BRRORS .0 .000 .250 -1.15
TRADEOFF ST BRRORS 2.0 .500 .250 1.15
WK DOM 1 ST BRRORS .0 .000 .250 -1.15
WK DOM 2 ST BRRORS .0 .000 .250 -1.15
WBAK BRRORS (WK): 2.0 .500
DOMINANT WK BRRORS .0 .000
TRADEOFF WK BRRORS 2.0 .500
WK DOM 1 WK BRRORS .0 .000
WK DOM 2 WK BRRORS .0 .000
Joint-Independence: Factor B ia the outside factor.
S , T of B W - .800
B Of S , T W > .790
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
SCALING INFORMATION
GROUP SCALB







THE SCALB VALUES FOR THB SUBSCALBS BBLOW

































APPROXIMATE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE 
OF BACH FACTOR
21.3857 % FOR FACTOR T. 
32.6150 « FOR FACTOR B. 




1 1 1 1 -1.1632
2 1 1 2 -.6194
3 1 1 3 -.0795
4 1 2 1 -.7880
5 1 2 2 -.2442
6 1 2 3 .2957
7 1 3 1 -.3948
8 1 3 2 .1490
9 1 3 3 .6889
10 2 1 1 -.9486
11 2 1 -.4047
12 2 1 3 .1351
13 2 2 1 -.5733
14 2 2 2 -.0295
15 2 2 3 .5104
16 2 3 1 -.1802
17 2 3 2 .3636
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19 3 1 1 -.6594 21.4
20 3 12 -.1155 44.5
21 3 1 3 .4243 67.4
22 3 2 1 -.2841 37.3
23 3 2 2 .2597 60.4
24 3 2 3 .7996 83.3
25 3 3 1 .1090 54.0
26 3 3 2 .6528 77.1
27 3 3 3 1.1927 100.0
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Appendix B
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD (IRB) APPROVAL FOR USE 
OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
This appendix includes the package submitted to the Institution Review Board (IRB) and the 
necessary approval documentation.
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S lC ollej* RoatP 
Durham, New Hampshire 03824-3585 
(£03) 862-3564 FAX
LAST NAME HanoHf]‘ :v F I R S T  NAME ;lffls * :v V :'X
DEFT Phys«*Oi»p*fm eitLDem e«^ APP'L DATE 2(76/2001
The InsMutlonat Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects In Research has reviewed the protocol far your project as 
Expedfted as described in Federal Regulations 49 CFR 48. Subsection 46.110 (b)catogory 7.
Approval la granted for one-year from the approval date above. At the end of the approval period you will be- asked.to 
submit*project report with regard to the involvement of hunjat) .subjects. If your-project Is attractive, you may apply for extension of 
IRB approval through this offfce.
The protection at human subjects In your study is an ongoing process for which you hold primary responsibility. In receiving IRB 
approval for your protocol, you agree to conduct (he project in accordance with the ethical principles and guidelines for the protection 
of human subjects In research, as deserted in the lottowing-three reports: Betmcnt Report;Tltle 46,-Code-of Federal Regulations. Part 
46rand;tlNH’a Multiple Pro^Vfceurahceof ObmpBenee. Thefujl text of thesedocuroenteie availableon the OSR informauon server 
at httoyftfww.Mm-edurosj^fltnifaiir^^ Cfllittliinct.f]trnf amf by request Aorfcthe Office of Sponsored Research.
Changpejn, Ajmroyah prto«. to their. UqplpmeniaUop;
you nwsf rscefve wrftmmuiKondfllcnaFeppfOYSf Trom- tnm IRB before' Implemshtfng them. IfyouhaVequestions 
or concerns about your project or this approval; please-feel free to contact this office at 862-2063. Please refer to the tRB * above in 








( Regulatory Compliance Manager
Fat the IRB,
tjsffice of Sponsored Research
cc: Re
Dr. John LaCaurse. Electrical A Computer Englneerfog Depv,
Figure B.1: Institutional Review Board Approval Letter
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Appendix C
CREW SUBJECTIVE SURVEYS
This appendix contains the sample surveys completed by the crews, as well as the SWAT 
card sort data sheets.
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Attachment *2 SubtKtiV Ktmum  WbrfteftCCf SctnMfiO * ___




II. Please circle a number corresponding to what you thought the difficulty level was of each of the three 
tasks you were to complete
Anomaly #1
Low difficulty Moderate Difficulty High Difficulty












Low difficulty Moderate Difficulty High Difficulty
1 2 3
i ......................
4 5 6 7 a 9 10
i
III. Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT) Ratings: Please rate each anomaly according to 
the SWAT Rating scale:
Time Load - Rating Seal* Definitions
1 Often nave spare time interruptions or overtap among activities occur infrequently a  not at alt
2 Occasionally nave spare time Interruptions or overlap among activities occur frequently
3 Almost never nave spare time Interruptions or overlap among activities are very frequent, or occur all tne time
Mental Effort Load - Rating Scale Definitions
1 very little conscious effort or concentration required Activity is almost automatic, requiring little attention
2 Moderate conscious mental effort or concentration required Complexity of activity is moderately nigh due to uncertainty 
unpredictability, or unfamilianty Considerable attention required.
3 Extensive mental effort and concentration are necessary Very complex activity requiring total attention
Psychological Stress Load * Rating Scale Definitions
t little confusion, nsk. frustration, or anxiety exists and can be easily accommodated.
2 Moderate stress due to confusion, frustration, or anxiety noticeable adds to workload. Significant compensation is required to
maintain adequate performance
3 High to very intense stress due to confusion, frustration, or anxiety High to extreme determination and self-control required
A n o m a ly *!: enterl.2. or3 for each
• T im e Load (1.2. or 3) ______________
• Mental Effort Load (1. 2. or 3) ___________
• Psychological Stress Load (1,2. or 3) ___________
Anomaly *2: enter 1.2. or 3 for each
• Time Load (1.2. or 3) ___________
• Mental Effort Load (1.2. or 3) ___________
• Psychological Stress Load (1.2. or 3) ___________
Anomaly *3: enter 1.2. or 3 for each
• Time Load (1.2. or 3) ___________
• Mental Effort Load (1.2. or 3) ___________
• Psychological Stress Load (1.2. or 3) ___________
Figure C.1: Subjective Measures Worksheet
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I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  
1/ I  I  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /  /
HI  /  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I
A/ /  /  /  /  /  /  I  I  /  /  /  /
N/ /  /  /  I I I  /  I I I  /  /
I |  I |  I | I ( ! I  I |  I 1 I 1 I I I I I
B Is  I 3 I?  15 I 4*I'T I 6»l I I I I
* l l b n  IT I W l’l I S l i m i l  I I I I
f r 4 . i 4 i i u - i * i * i 4 - n  i t i i i
j i e  I 9 112-114-1T lU-ltSI 4-1 I I I I
C 1 I  IS I Ifcl'lB I 1511513J-) 2*1 I I I I
* i t  11015 1 fc i s i a  i £  i a  i i i i i
* i isi n n fe i is ia n’i i  14-n i i  i i i i
m 134 |taiap|ioiwi*Jl3S&<> I I I I I
U I 3.1 2-13-1 *  14-17.12. I 2.1 I I I I
« 11*1*7112-mn | * l  I I I I
2 I IS I 12-111 111 l2ol 131 H l|8 I I I I I
* I £ I 0  I fc I £  I ® I I S I I | | | |
Figure C.2: SWAT Card Sort Data Sheet
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SWAT CARD SORT DATA SHEET (continued)
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I
V  /  /  /  /•  I  /  - /  /  w  /  /
H/ / / /  / /  / /  / /  / /  /
A / / / / / / / / / / / / /  
f t / / / / / / / / / / / /  /
Q 1 iH - M S l* ?  I I I I I
ZZ I 23I lelWH*? IW 123.138 lii-l I I I I
MCol l felU ( £ 1 4  l ( H 6  If+I I I I I
e I «-| 3*1 H |o.f U H W IH  life I I I I I
R |2^ |34r 124 |25|2S|2*|2A|25I I I I I
» I 3 I S  IB 14 16 I 4 1 *  IS I I I I I
f I fa I 111 is i / i  I te 1101 iz i 1 1 i 1 1
0 lM ll« l2 fc l24-l»H ie lZ |l23 l I I I I
v 111  h a  1 0  U o  1 / »  1 i t  1 ° i 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1
a 1171 n  izsizj-iz) i2o iie  1 is 1 1 1 1 1
0  | 0 4 - | 2 * | i i | Z * | 2 t . | 2 i f | 2 4 l 2 4 J  I I I I
L 114-12-1 104-1W hs ll<) l|o 13.11 I I I I
T |*5 |3S l*a l23|2A l*S ll0 l 12.1 I I I I
1 12-7 1^ -7 I au-TIO-t I IT? 12-7 12--] i 2_iI I I I I
Figure C.2: SWAT Card Sort Data Sheet (Continued) 
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Appendix D 
SAMPLE SCENARIO FORMAT
This appendix contains a sample of the pre-brief, scenario, and out-brief administered to 
each crew.
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INITIAL EVALUATION PREBRIEF
INTRODUCTION: The purpose of this briefing is to acquaint you with our evaluation procedures. 
Please listen carefully and feel free to ask questions at any time. If anyone is feeling ill or feels they 
cannot participate, please let me know at this time.
PARTICIPANT INTRODUCTION: Chad Oster and I will be administering this scenario. Please refer 
any questions to either of us.
INVESTIGATOR/PARTICIPANT RELATIONSHIP: We are here to observe and evaluate your 
performance. We will not provide instruction or assist you in any way while you perform your assigned 
duties, with exception of input clarification or vehicle response. You are expected to perform all 
actions as you would on duty as a mission ready crew member, so act as you would on a real world 
shift with real world supports. Always complete an action unless we state "action complete". Make 
sure you understand which action is considered complete. Be sure to speak loudly and clearly so we 
are aware of all actions you are performing. If you do not understand an input or stimulus, ask your 
evaluator to clarify the situation. Please note, we will be writing in our notebook(s) throughout the 
evaluation -  this is strictly for recording activities and time required to complete the necessary 
actions.
We would also like to request refraining from what could be called "excessive behavior” (for example, 
abnormal levels of drinking, smoking, or exercise) during the scenario periods. This can skew your 
performance and affect the outcome of your success as a crew.
METHODS USED TO INITIATE EVENTS: Stimuli for this scenario may be presented in the following 
ways:
• Verbal input from us acting as an RTS
• Simulator/Emulator satellite contacts
• Verbal representation of satellite status in the even of a simulator malfunction
Prioritize all stimuli as if it were real world. Please clearly announce your anomaly resolution priority 
clearly so that we may accurately record your actions.
SAFETY: Safety is of the utmost importance! Do not take any actions which endanger human life or 
cause injury. Within the simulation area please be aware of (safety hazards in the evaluation area) or 
There are no safety hazards in the area that we are aware of.
RESPONSIBILITIES DURING ACTUAL EMERGENCIES OR MALFUNCTIONS. We will stop or 
terminate a scenario if a real world emergency or malfunction interferes with the evaluation.
OPSEC/COMSEC: Proper OPSEC/COMSEC procedures must be followed at all times. We will not 
simulate any classified actions. If you have concerns that a particular action will lead you to 
breaching an unclassified environment, please stop the scenario at once and bring it immediately to 
our attention.
CREW SUPPORT: During this scenario, you will act as a crew. Keep in mind the scenario is to see 
how the crew works together to achieve a common goal: ensuring the health of the satellite.
INVOLVED AGENCIES: There will be virtually no external agencies involved with these scenarios 
other than communication between you and the Remote Tracking Station (RTS).
CLOCK ADJUSTMENTS: The scenario is set to be one hour in length; it will not be necessary to 
advance the clock to expedite the scenario.
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REMINDERS: Please remember this scenario is controlled material. .Do not discuss anything related 
to the scenario with anyone except Chad or myself.
QUESTIONS: Do you have any questions?
STARTING STATUS: Read individual scenario starting status. Crew is on a day shift in SOC-12.
Pre/Post Scenario Actions:
PRE
1. Check Tape Length
2. Configure Scenario
3. Pre-brief:
• Complete canned brief
• Remind crews there will be 3 “problems", “anomalies", or “things” to 
accomplish during the scenario
• Prepare crews for poor emulator presentation -  encourage questions 
pertaining to OOL telemetry points, etc.
4. Present pass plans and starting status





• Initiate survey part 1 (Anomaly Query). When complete, announce correct 
anomalies
• Initiate survey part 2 (SWAT)
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SCENARIO FORMAT
GROUND RULES:
■ This is one-hour scenario representing an extended satellite support to provide critical mission 
data to warfighters in a wartime environment.
■ Each scenario will be comprised of three vehicle anomalies. These anomalies are strictly limited 
to satellite anomalies; the ground environment will remain constant and nominal.
■ Your goal is to repair, swap components, or safe the vehicle to remedy the anomalies
■ You, as a crew, should coordinate the solution and any actions to be taken to complete these 
tasks
■ Following the scenario, a subjective workload assessment task survey will be distributed to 
determine your perceived difficulty of each task presented in the scenario.
• The focus of task completion should be accuracy and timeliness. This is the data that will be 
noted and recorded during the scenario.
■ You will have available to you all documentation necessary, to include operator manuals, 
standard command plans, and vehicle technical documentation.
SCENARIO: Wartime environment.
Preface: This scenario is an unrealistic, but challenging environment where you have total and 
complete control of the satellite. Your main goal is to ensure critical mission data is provided to the 
warfighter without fail. You have been given clearance to take any action necessary to maintain 
mission data. This includes emergency commanding, altering typical vehicle configuration, switching 
to redundant components, and any other action necessary to attempt to restore optimal operation.
■ You have Satellite Control Authority (SCA) over the vehicle
■ Take any action necessary to maintain nominal vehicle operation
■ Actions may be taken completely at your discretion
■ Coordination with TRW or AEROJET is not required
■ Coordination with HHQ or other DoD or Air Force Agencies is not required
TAKING ACTION:
• Clearly voice all conclusions and actions to be taken to the crewmembers. Crew consensus will
be voiced through the Lead SSO/CCMDR.
■ Desired vehicle responses will, for the most part, be evident Some extraneous vehicle reactions 
may not be present for several reasons. These reasons include emulator limitations, or merely 
the inability to predict overall vehicle reaction to certain situations or anomalies.
■ If there are any questions pertaining to the response of the vehicle to your actions that are not 
obvious, please ask
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4. Select Elset E (TCMOM X3)
Nominal Star Data outside sun shutter region




















Overview: Event detector is in alarm at beginning of the support. 50SW/WX reports high proton activity, which may be one problem source. In 
addition, this activity causes bit-flips on the vehicle, affecting the plenum pump status (ENA) and impact sensor (10G vice 20G). When fixing the 
plenum pump state, plenum pressure reads low (PGGA1P and PGGA2P) at ~48 psi. The crew tries to pump plenum, but the pump does not 
work. Since there is no decrease in pressure, a leak should be ruled out. The action required is to determine that transducer 1 is faulty and 





1 1.1 Event Detector. Imoact 
Sensor, and Plenum Points 
OOL: Event detector is in alarm 
at beginning of the support. 
50SW/WX reports high proton 
activity, which may be the 
problem source. In addition, 
this activity causes bit-flips on 
the vehicle, affecting the 
plenum pump status (ENA) and 
impact sensor (10G vice 20G).
1.1 Perform Checklist 
S-1 and note OOL 
TLM points. Prioritize 
anomalies (1. EVENT 
Detector, 2. IMPACT 
Sensor, and 3. 




ISAALA = YES 
ADHLAB = HIEV 
ADLLAB = LOEV 
AGE1AB = ENA 
PGGA1P = 48.2 
PGGA2P = 48.2
1.1 N/A
1 1.2 Resolve Level 1 
anomaly. Event 









ADHLAB = HIEV 
ADLLAB = LO EV 
ADPCAV -  5 
























Type Description Crew Assessment/Actions Telemetry Verifiers Commanding
2 2.1 RecoanizeBit 
FHds from Droton 
event have caused 
the anomalous 
Doints: Clear 
IMPACT Sensor and 
pump PLENUM. 
Realize that the 
PUMP is in ENA 
state, but the 
plenum pressure is 
low. Crew should 
disable the pump 
and decide course 
of action.
2.1 Impact sensor: (CL C-13)
2.1.1 Verify TLM points
2.1.2 Calculate necessary 
repeat steps to clear 
alarm. Send command 
to clear the alarm
2.1.3 Calculate necessary 
steps to reset to proper setting 
(20G). Send commands 







































Type Description Crew Assessment/Actions Telemetry Verifiers Commanding
2 2.2 Disable the pump and assess PLENUM 
IAW Checklist B-1. Crew should note the 
low plenum pressure readings (PGGA1P 
and PGGA2P) of ~48.2 psi. Also, crew 
should note that the ENA state is non- 
nominal, and that the pressure is low 
despite the pump already being enabled.
2.2 N/A 2.2 N/A
2.2.1 Verify PLENUM TLM points.
Plenum does not pump up 
However, there is no pressure decrease, ruling 
out a hydrazine leak
Command AGE1AB to disable.
2.2.1
SNAP
AGE1AB = ENA 







AGE1AB = DIS 
PGGA1P = 48.2 
PGGA2P = 48.2













Type Description Crew Assessment/Actions Telemetry Verifiers Commanding
2 Attempt sequence again to pump 
the plenum; recognize there 
is not a leak.
Level Select is 62.50 and gas 
generator "A” is disabled
VDE-A GG-A1 ENABLE
Verify plenum pump up; 
however, pump does not 
appear to work
2.3.4 VDE-A GG-A1/A2 
DISABLE
2.3 Verifv on SNAP
2.3.1 AGE1AB = DIS 
LVLSEL = 62.50




C5: S 0053 VDE-A GG-A1 
ENABLE
2.3.4 CMD DESC 
C6: S 0463 VDE-A GG-A1/A2 
DISABLE
3 3.1 Troubleshoot and 
fix Drimarv transducer: 
The primary 
transducer is bad. 





transducer failures can 
be corrected by simply 
switching to the 
redundant gas 
generator transducer.
3.1 View ACSS Screen 3.1
ACSS
PGGA1P reads ~ 48.2 















Type Description Crew Assessment/Actions Telemetry Verifiers Commanding




PGGA1P = 48.2 











C8:S 0211 CE A-A SER CMD 
EXEC
3 Complete B-1; pump plenum on 
coil 2
Level Select is 62.50 and gas 
generator “A" is disabled 
VDE-A GG-A1 ENABLE
Verify plenum pump up
VDE-A GG-A1/A2 DISABLE 
SAFELOAD
3.5 Verify proper functioning of 
coil 2 and nominal TLM; complete 
S-1
3.4 Verify following telemetry 
points on SNAP:
3.4.1 AGE1AB = DIS 
LVLSEL = 62.50
3.4. 3 PGGA1P = 62.5 
PGGA2P = 62.5
3.4.4 AGE1AB = DIS (C10) 
CMDREG = 000033




3.4 2 CMD DESC 
C9: S 0377 VDE-A GG-A2
ENABLE
3.4.3 N/A
3.4.4 CMD DESC 
C10: S 0463 VDE-A GG-A1/A2
DISABLE
3 4 5 CMD DESC 
C11: S 5033 SAFELOAD
3.5 N/A
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